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OVERSIGHT RIDERS
Kevin M. Stack* and Michael P. Vandenbergh**
Congress has a constitutionally critical duty to gather information about how the
executive branch implements the powers Congress has granted it and the funds
Congress has appropriated. Yet in recent years the executive branch has systematically
thwarted Congress’s powers and duties of oversight. Congressional subpoenas for
testimony and documents have met with blanket refusals to comply, frequently backed
by advice from the Department of Justice that executive privilege justifies withholding
the information. Even when Congress holds an official in contempt for failure to
comply with a congressional subpoena, the Department of Justice often does not initiate
criminal sanctions. As a result, Congress has resorted to enforcing its subpoenas in
civil litigation, with terrible results. Civil enforcement, if any, occurs years after the
information was sought, practically eliminating the information’s practical and
political value. Changes in administrations can be expected to affect the willingness of
the executive branch to thwart congressional oversight, but the problem will remain
until systemic reforms discourage the most egregious forms of executive evasion. To
overcome this reliance on judicial enforcement of its oversight powers, Congress needs
to think more creatively and aggressively. One way of doing so, which we defend in
this Article, is using Congress’s powers of the purse to condition funding to agencies on
their compliance with congressional oversight requests, employing what we call
oversight riders. By denying funding to executive agencies’ resistance to oversight,
Congress can create personal legal incentives for executive branch officials to comply.
The Article concludes by considering whether other underenforced regimes, including
requirements addressing political activity, ethics, and transparency, might also be
protected by similar riders.
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INTRODUCTION
The executive branch repeatedly thwarts Congress’s efforts to
engage in oversight of its administration of the laws. Consider a
snapshot from just the past two years:
1. A House oversight committee sought information from the
Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce
about the citizenship question proposed for the 2020
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Census. 1 After the administration declined to permit the
testimony, 2 the House held two cabinet officials in
contempt, 3 and resorted to civil litigation to enforce their
finding of contempt. 4 The enforcement of contempt
remained tied up in the D.C. federal courts until after the
November 2020 election. 5
2. A House armed services committee sought the testimony of
top civilian and military leaders of the Department of
Defense concerning the use of the military in response to
nationwide protests, but none were made available to testify. 6
3. The House subpoenaed Defense Secretary Mark Esper to
testify regarding the administration’s decision to withhold
military aid for Ukraine.7 Secretary Esper initially promised
that the Pentagon would “do everything [it] can to respond
to their inquiry,” 8 but he later reneged and did not appear. 9
Although the level of executive branch resistance to congressional
oversight was particularly extreme during the Trump administration,
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1 Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and
Reform, to William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just. (June 3, 2019), https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2019-06-03.EEC%20to
%20Barr-DOJ%20re%20Census.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDP8-DG4D].
2 Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Elijah E.
Cummings, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Reform (June 6, 2019), https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Letter%20from%20DOJ
%20to%20COR%2006-06-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AVY-MCSJ].
3 H.R. Res. 497, 116th Cong. (2019).
4 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 54, Comm. on Oversight &
Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v. Barr, No. 19-cv-03557 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2019).
5 Minute Order, Comm. on Oversight & Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v.
Barr, No. 19-cv-03557 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2020).
6 Letter from Adam Smith, Chairman, House Armed Servs. Comm., to Sec’y Mark T.
Esper, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (June 10, 2020), https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache
/files/f/2/f2c8cc6e-4348-4de0-a9e5-f45367474b2e/0C419C3BA406745F6167BF3372B
36122.20200610-smith-letter-to-sec-def-follow-up-to-june-3-letter-vfinal.pdf [https://perma
.cc/46ST-4X3F].
7 Letter from Adam B. Schiff, Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intel.,
and Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, House Comm. on Foreign Affs., and Elijah E. Cummings,
Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Reform, to Mark T. Esper, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Def. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2019-10-07.eec_engel
_schiff_to_esper-dod_re_subpoena.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q95-M8W3].
8 Quint Forgey, Mark Esper: Pentagon ‘Will Do Everything We Can’ to Respond to
Impeachment Subpoena, POLITICO (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10
/13/mark-esper-trump-impeachment-subpoena-045733 [https://perma.cc/E6QY-YY56].
9 Lauren Egan & Courtney Kube, Defense Secretary Mark Esper Will No Longer Comply
with Impeachment Inquiry, NBC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics
/trump-impeachment-inquiry/defense-secretary-mark-esper-will-no-longer-complyimpeachment-inquiry-n1067226 [https://perma.cc/BCS9-YZ3J].

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 70 Side B

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B67$&.B(7B$/BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

130

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

30

[VOL. 97:1

C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

10 See infra Section I.D.
11 See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821) (implying that Congress’s
coercive powers terminate on adjournment).
12 The importance of timely enforcement of congressional subpoenas is reflected in
the focus on expedited enforcement in recently proposed legislation. See, e.g., Protecting
Our Democracy Act, H.R. 8363, 116th Cong. §§ 401–405 (2020) (providing an explicit
cause of action for Congress to enforce subpoenas, stating that “it shall be the duty of every
court of the United States to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any
such action and appeal,” and stating that “[t]he Supreme Court and the Judicial
Conference of the United States shall prescribe rules of procedure to ensure the
expeditious treatment of actions described in subsection (a)”) (adding 28 U.S.C. § 1365a).
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the basic problem extends well beyond it. 10 The executive branch has
long been playing constitutional hardball in response to Congress’s
efforts at oversight—and winning.
These clashes follow a familiar pattern. A House or Senate
committee requests the testimony of an executive official and related
documents. Sometimes negotiations ensue over the scope or terms of
the testimony and documents to be produced. Sometimes the
executive simply stonewalls. After a period of delay, a House or Senate
committee then issues a subpoena. The executive official continues to
resist, almost always asserting that executive privilege protects the
matter from disclosure. With the pressures on Congress, the initial
refusal to comply with a congressional subpoena often effectively ends
the matter in a stalemate in which Congress has not obtained the
information it sought. In highly charged cases, Congress finds the
official in contempt. Regardless of whether the official was held in
contempt, when the stakes are high enough, the House or Senate
resorts to initiating a civil lawsuit to seek an injunction to enforce
compliance with its subpoenas. After often lengthy delays common in
litigation, the congressional committee’s investigation may or may not
produce a judicial order requiring executive branch officials to testify
or disclose information.
In this predictable back-and-forth, the executive branch has a
trump card on disclosure to Congress: the assertion of executive
privilege effectively forces the House or Senate into civil litigation.
Congress, like any other civil litigant frustrated by its adversary’s
noncompliance with discovery requests, often backs down. Moreover,
for the executive branch, delay in disclosure can be a win. A subpoena
only has force for the session of Congress that authorizes it,11 and
absent a sense of urgency among courts, competent counsel can delay
the issuance of a final, enforceable order for the year to eighteen
months often necessary to avoid compliance. This delay can
undermine institutional and direct democratic accountability. 12 A
delay beyond the current session of Congress may enable politics in
the House or Senate to shift enough to undermine the value of the
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13 See infra Section I.B.
14 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of the
Congress to conduct investigations . . . encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes
surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling
the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”); see also infra Section I.B
(discussing the constitutional authority for congressional investigations).
15 See infra Section I.B.
16 See infra Section I.D.
17 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2312, 2312–15 (2006). But see David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in
Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–10 (2018) (arguing that institutional loyalties play
a stronger role than acknowledged in recent scholarship).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 71 Side A

information in crafting reform legislation or to sideline demands for
the requested information altogether. On a more fundamental level,
a delay that extends beyond an election undermines voters’ ability to
hold federal politicians accountable for their actions based on the
withheld information.
The motivating concern of this Article is the loss Congress and the
public suffer when Congress is not able to obtain subpoenaed
documents and testimony in a timely manner. The loss is significant.
Congress has broad, constitutionally recognized, statutorily
authorized, and practically critical powers to investigate the executive
branch’s administration of the law. 13 The capacity to effectively
investigate plays a critical role in our constitutional scheme. To
legislate, to decide how to spend the moneys collected in the Treasury,
to decide who should be impeached, Congress needs information. It
needs information about what is going right and wrong in our society,
economy, and in relation to other nations. It needs information about
what existing federal programs and activities are succeeding in
accomplishing the mission congressional statutes have set for them,
and the causes of failures and setbacks. It needs information about the
performance of executive branch officers to ensure public confidence
and compliance with federal laws. This simple logic justifies broad
powers of congressional investigation, has been endorsed by the
Supreme Court, 14 and has been reflected in statutes organizing
Congress’s oversight powers. 15 Throughout our history, congressional
investigations have played a critical role in bringing to light problems
in our government and the path forward.16
The problem of congressional oversight is a symptom of a larger
weakness in our system of separation of powers. As Richard Pildes and
Daryl Levinson argue, the interaction between the branches is better
described by looking at the separation of parties than the separation
of branches. 17 When institutional loyalty is subordinate to party loyalty,
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18 See Eli J. Finkel et al., Political Sectarianism in America, 370 SCIENCE 533, 535 (2020).
19 Gillian E. Metzger, Taking Appropriations Seriously, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1153
(2021).
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”).
21 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2018) (prohibitions); § 1350 (penalties).
22 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. E, tit. VII, § 713,
134 Stat. 1185, 1432–33 (2020). The same provision has previously been with other section
numbers, including § 618. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199,
div. F, tit. VI, § 618, 188 Stat. 3, 354 (2004); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,
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enforcement of congressional oversight powers will frequently be a
function of whether the President is from the same party as the house
of Congress investigating. When government is divided by parties, the
executive branch effectively abandons its role in enforcing contempt
of congressional subpoenas. Political polarization has exacerbated this
dynamic. 18 In response, Congress has therefore turned to the courts,
with very poor results.
Congressional oversight need not remain stuck within its current
pattern of congressional request–executive branch objections–
congressional subpoena–stalemate–executive privilege–civil litigation–
mootness arising from delay. Congress can engage in constitutional
hardball as well. Indeed, it is time for Congress to be more creative
and more aggressive in developing solutions that do not depend upon
the courts. “One of Congress’s main tools to push back at such
presidential unilateralism,” as Gillian Metzger observes, “is its control
of the purse.” 19 In particular, this Article makes the case that Congress
can and should use its appropriations power 20 as a tool to force
compliance with its request for information from the executive
branch. The Article defends doing so by calling attention to a class of
appropriations riders that target the executive branch’s obstruction of
congressional oversight. We call these oversight riders. The basic idea
of an oversight rider is to deny the executive branch funding for
resistance to congressional subpoenas. Executive branch officials
cannot lawfully act inconsistent with a limitation Congress has imposed
on their funds, 21 and Congress has the power to deny executive
officials’ salaries during the period of their noncompliance. Executive
branch officials typically exercise great care not to contravene the
limitations Congress has placed on their appropriations. By attaching
appropriations consequences for noncompliance with congressional
subpoenas, oversight riders give executive branch officials the kind of
ex ante legal incentives to comply that they currently lack.
We identify two oversight riders. The first denies appropriations
to officials who thwart subordinates from communicating with
Congress. This rider, identified as the Section 713 rider,22 has been
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Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. J, tit. V, § 620, 117 Stat. 11, 468 (2003). The text of the rider is
reproduced in the text accompanying note 161 below.
23 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2018); 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-382SP,
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 6-36 (3rd ed. 2006).
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reenacted in appropriations legislation since the late 1990s, but it
remains relatively obscure. It is enforced by a member of Congress
requesting that the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a part
of the legislative branch, conduct an investigation into the alleged
violation. After the investigation, if a violation is found, the GAO
directs a clawback of the official’s salary; for continuing violations, the
clawback can match the duration of the violation. In investigating
violations of the Section 713 rider, the GAO has acted promptly and
found liability on two occasions. Structurally, the Section 713 rider
suggests a pathway to overcome the obstacles of Congress’s more
traditional routes to enforcing its oversight powers. It creates a
personal incentive for the official to comply, without requiring the
involvement of the Department of Justice or the delay of civil litigation
to enforce the subpoena.
The second oversight rider is one we suggest. Modeled on the
language of the Section 713 rider, this oversight rider directly targets
compliance with subpoenas. In addition to the salary sanction, this
subpoena rider adds a prohibition on use of funds for resistance to
congressional subpoenas. As a result, the subpoena rider we propose
creates not only the prospect of a salary sanction, like the Section 713
rider, but also the prospect of violation of the Antideficiency Act,
which prohibits a federal official from spending federal funds that
have not been appropriated by Congress. 23 Decisions to resist
congressional subpoenas implicate the Antideficiency Act because they
are frequently institutional decisions, involving significant internal
deliberations and use of government employment time and other
resources, not merely the choice of an official acting on his or her own
initiative.
Both riders—the existing Section 713 rider and our proposed
subpoena rider—would create an ex ante incentive for an official to
avoid relying on an overly broad assertion of executive privilege (or
indeed, any assertion of privilege greater than they would estimate the
court would sustain). The subpoena rider in particular forces the
official faced with a congressional subpoena to evaluate the
reasonableness of the assertion of executive privilege; if, in the
official’s estimation, it is beyond the scope of what a court would
sustain, then the official would face a personal risk of loss of salary plus
the legal consequences from violating the Antideficiency Act.
Executive branch officials may decide that the risk of personal
consequences is low and continue to reject compliance with
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24 31 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (2018) (authorizing administrative discipline for violations of
§ 1341 and § 1342).
25 31 U.S.C. § 1351 (2018) (specifying reporting requirements).
26 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). Although there do not appear to have been prosecutions
for violations of the ADA. See 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 23, at 6-144
(noting that GAO is not aware of prosecutions). Even the prospect of committing a felony
has a deterrence effect on executive officials.
27 See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 12 (2014).
28 Id. (italics omitted).
29 See, e.g., Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders,
1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 464–65 (providing concise summary of concerns with use of limitations
riders, including that they bypass authorizing committees in Congress and they are given
inadequate consideration and study).
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congressional subpoena, but oversight riders may be the only practical
way to create a genuine personal risk for noncompliance. Oversight
riders remove the license of executive branch officials to ignore
congressional subpoenas with impunity. Unless the officials estimate
that they have a valid claim of executive privilege as judged by the
courts, defying a congressional subpoena creates the risk of a clawback
of their salaries during the period of their refusal to comply as well as
violations of the Antideficiency Act, which creates potential exposure
for administrative sanctions, 24 triggers internal executive branch
reporting requirements, 25 and carries penalties for willful noncompliance. 26 These salary clawback and appropriations-based liability risks
will continue after the session of Congress that issued the subpoena,
thus motivating compliance by executive branch officials even if they
think they can run out the clock on a congressional session.
This technique of squeezing funding for the executive branch
operations as a consequence—and eventually as a deterrent—for
noncompliance with congressional requests for information is an
instance of constitutional self-help. 27 As David Pozen explicates the
concept of constitutional self-help, it involves “the unilateral attempt
by a government actor to resolve a perceived wrong by another branch,
and thereby to defend a perceived institutional prerogative, through
means that are generally impermissible but that are assertedly
permitted in context.” 28 Oversight riders fit this pattern. With
oversight riders, Congress would have a response to the hardball tactics
of the executive branch—repeated, entrenched stonewalling in
response to congressional requests for information—and thus a
perceived and actual harm. Like many forms of self-help, oversight
riders involve tough tactics that ideally would not be necessary. No one
nominates appropriations riders as the most deliberate, careful, or
public aspect of the legislative process. 29 And no one invites
government shutdowns which could result from stalemates over
annual appropriations. Reflecting this general reluctance, Congress
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has rarely used its appropriations powers to directly strike back against
executive branch refusal to cooperate in response to its requests for
information. 30 But the oversight function of Congress is particularly
important in an era of hyper-partisanship, and thus oversight riders are
worth these costs. They are targeted, reciprocal, and proportionate to
the harms of the executive branch stonewalling they seek to address.31
This Article is organized as follows. Part I explains why oversight
is critical to our government and well-grounded in constitutional and
statutory law. It then illustrates how frequently the executive branch
thwarts congressional oversight. Part II is the heart of the Article. It
surveys the tools Congress has primarily relied upon to enforce its
oversight powers. It argues that Congress’s inherent contempt powers,
criminal liability for contempt, civil liability for contempt, and general
civil actions to enforce cooperation are all insufficient and have failed.
It then introduces the category of oversight riders, first discussing one
existing rider and then proposing a rider targeting noncompliance
with congressional subpoenas with greater sanctions. It defends the
constitutionality of oversight riders and justifies relying upon them in
the current climate of constitutional hardball. Part III broadens the
Article’s lens to consider whether appropriations riders could help to
enforce good government norms that currently lack adequate
enforcement, ranging from protections against partisan use of federal
power and federal ethics laws to laws governing the transparency of
government action.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONALLY CRITICAL ROLE OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT

Oversight is critical to Congress’s core functions of legislating,
appropriating, and confirming nominations. 32 Oversight allows Congress to learn how the funds it appropriates and the programs it
authorizes function. And what it learns can be key to reform or
holding individual executive officers to account. Because congressional hearings are one of the nation’s most public tribunals, oversight
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30 See SEAN M. STIFF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46417, CONGRESS’S POWER OVER
APPROPRIATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 60–61 (2020). We discuss
one example below. See infra text accompanying notes 146 to 151 (discussing retaliation in
appropriations rider after Lois Lerner’s refusal to testify).
31 Cf. Pozen, supra note 27, at 64 (arguing constitutional self-help operates in a
convention that privileges reciprocal and proportionate countermeasures).
32 Devins, supra note 29, at 460 (“Oversight of executive organization and action is a
traditional function of Congress.” (citing LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (2d ed. 1985))).
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performs a critical political function as well; it provides one of the most
important ways for the public to learn about the executive branch’s
actions at a time when it is salient for holding the President
accountable, including at the ballot box. Moreover, the existence of
robust congressional oversight also acts as a deterrent to executive
branch misconduct.
The logic for broad congressional powers to investigate—
including to compel documents and testimony from the executive
branch—is hard to assail. Information is necessary for Congress to
legislate. As the Supreme Court wrote in 1927 in McGrain v.
Daugherty, 33 and recently endorsed in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP 34:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information—which not
infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. 35



C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

33 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (upholding Congress’s power to
compel the testimony of a private party relevant to its legislation).
34 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2044–45 (2020).
35 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175; Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031 (“Without information,
Congress would be shooting in the dark, unable to legislate ‘wisely or effectively.’” (quoting
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175)) (upholding Congress’s power to compel the testimony of a
private party relevant to its legislation).
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cls. 6–7; art. II, § 4.
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
40 Josh Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 541–42 (2020)
[hereinafter Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech].
41 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
42 See Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40, at 542.
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And of course, the same holds true for all of Congress’s other powers.
To effectively exercise its impeachment power, 36 power to
appropriate, 37 power to confirm principal officers,38 and ratify
treaties, 39 Congress must have the power to compel information. 40 As
McGrain recognizes, “[e]xperience has taught that mere requests for
such information often are unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means
of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.” 41 Moreover,
because Congress’s power of investigation is necessary for the
performance of Congress’s other constitutionally vested powers, the
oversight power must be understood broadly. 42 As the Supreme Court
emphasizes in Mazars: “The congressional power to obtain
information is ‘broad’ and ‘indispensable.’ . . . It encompasses
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inquiries into the administration of existing laws, studies of proposed
laws, and ‘surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system
for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.’”43 To
exercise its powers, Congress must be able to obtain a sufficiently wide
array of information so that it can assess alternatives, understand the
full context of past actions, and predict trends, and it must be able to
do so in a timely manner.44
Congressional oversight serves another critical function as well: it
deters executive branch wrongdoing. 45 Appearance in a public hearing before a congressional oversight committee is an experience that
most executive branch officials aim to avoid. Congressional oversight
hearings expose the official through highly public questioning by the
members of Congress and function as the nation’s tribunal for
evaluating the activities of the executive, corporate conduct, and much
more. Exposure of executive branch ineptitude or wrongdoing can
occur through document production, depositions, and testimony
before a committee and can lead to embarrassment, firing, or in the
worst cases potential criminal exposure. 46 The power of Congress to
haul executive branch officials before its investigative committees
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43 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (quoting Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 215 (1957)).
44 As to Congress’s ability to compel testimony from executive branch officials, see
BEN WILHELM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46061, VOLUNTARY TESTIMONY BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OFFICIALS: AN INTRODUCTION (2019) (concluding that “Congress’s control over
appropriations and the organization and operations of the executive branch may
encourage agency leaders to accommodate its requests rather than risk adverse actions
toward their agencies. In addition, there are incentives for the executive branch to work
with Congress in order to increase the likelihood of success for the Administration’s policy
agenda and to manage investigations with the potential to damage the Administration’s
public standing”); see also OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRCULAR A–11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (rev. 2021);
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A–19,
LEGISLATIVE COORDINATION AND CLEARANCE (rev. 1979) (providing guidance for
coordinating and controlling agency statements to Congress on budgetary and legislative
issues).
45 William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 799 (2004); Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40, at 542–43
n.97 (quoting Marty Lederman: “As virtually anyone who’s worked in the executive branch
will attest, the prospect (or threat) of having to explain one’s self . . . to a congressional
chair or staff, or in congressional hearings under the harsh glare of network lights, has a
significant impact on how one performs her work as an official” (quoting Marty Lederman,
Can Congress Investigate Whether the President Has Conflicts of Interest, Is Compromised by Russia,
or Has Violated the Law?, BALKINIZATION (July 29, 2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019
/07/can-congress-investigate-whether.html [https://perma.cc/EGT3-63Y2])).
46 See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Lavelle Indicted by Grand Jury on Contempt of Congress Charge,
WASH. POST (May 28, 1983) (reporting indictment of Rita Lavelle, former EPA official,
regarding her refusal to testify).
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creates powerful incentives to comply with the law and to do so in ways
that could be explained to Congress.
Not surprisingly, congressional oversight has been the launching
pad for many significant executive branch reforms in the past several
decades and before. Post-Watergate reforms of ethics in government
and the creation of the independent counsel grew out of Congress’s
investigations. 47 Post-9/11 reforms in the coordination and mission of
our national intelligence agencies built upon both the 9/11
Commission and Congress’s own investigation of the failures that led
to the 9/11 attack going undetected. 48 And, we anticipate, congressional hearings into the national response to COVID-19 will play a role
in both the immediate solution and the creation of longer-term
structures to make the country better prepared for pandemics.
Congressional hearings and oversight also play a crucial role in
the dynamics of national and state elections. These hearings provide
public scrutiny of the choices made by executive branch officials in
response to crises—and these hearings create a sense of effectiveness,
failure, or evasion that ripples through subsequent political campaigns. President George W. Bush campaigned against Vice President
Al Gore in part based on the impression of perfidy produced by
President Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial. 49 President Barack Obama
campaigned against Senator John McCain in part by condemning
President Bush’s responses to 9/11 and failure to act on the reforms
suggested by congressional investigators and the 9/11 Commission. 50
President Donald Trump used Congress’s investigation of Benghazi,
the bungled rollout of the Affordable Care Act, and policies at the
border to campaign against Hillary Clinton.51
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47 See Mark Curriden, The Lawyers of Watergate: How a ‘3rd-Rate Burglary’ Provoked New
Standards for Lawyer Ethics, 98 A.B.A. J. 38, 41–43 (2012); Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the
Independent Counsel Law, FRONTLINE (1998), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline
/shows/counsel/office/history.html [https://perma.cc/5ZVN-F7T8].
48 See Mark Fenster, Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form,
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239, 1287–92 (2008).
49 Alison Mitchell, The 2000 Campaign: The Campaign Trail; Bush and His Rivals Touring
the Same Highly Contested States, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000
/07/29/us/2000-campaign-campaign-trail-bush-his-rivals-touring-same-highly-contested
.html [https://perma.cc/4LNJ-MQPJ].
50 See Democratic Nat’l Comm., 2008 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Aug. 25, 2008), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2008-democraticparty-platform [https://perma.cc/H2N3-MK3T]; Jay Newton-Small, Bush Starts a McCainObama Brawl, TIME (May 16, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/politics/article
/0,8599,1807377,00.html [https://perma.cc/TJ2F-YU8D].
51 Aaron Blake, Donald Trump’s Best Speech of the 2016 Campaign, Annotated, WASH.
POST (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/08/19
/donald-trumps-best-speech-of-the-2016-campaign-annotated/ [https://perma.cc/S55BNCL7].
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Typically, the timing of oversight is critical to the ability of the
public to hold members of Congress and the President to account.
Disclosures that are delayed by a year or two can easily enable an
administration to avoid scrutiny before the election of a new Congress,
with the potential for a change in party majority in either house.
Disclosure delayed beyond the next presidential election can make a
huge difference in the record the public has to assess the performance
of the President and his or her administration.
Not only are broad powers of disclosure critical for Congress to
perform its core constitutional functions, but those same powers are
also critical to deterring executive branch wrongdoing and exposing
that wrongdoing to the public so it can hold the executive branch
accountable.
B. Congress’s Constitutional and Statutory Powers of Oversight
Although the text of the Constitution does not explicitly grant
investigative power to Congress or grant either of its chambers an
investigative power, 52 the existence of a broad power to investigate the
executive branch is not controversial as a matter of historical practice
and has been repeatedly endorsed by the Supreme Court. 53 Congress’s
earliest formal investigation was an inquest into a failed military
endeavor—understood as oversight of the President’s expenditure of
appropriated funds. In 1792, General Arthur St. Clair lost more than
600 soldiers in a confrontation with Native Americans at the Battle of
the Wabash. 54 In response to the outcry over the expedition, the
House voted (44 to 10) to appoint a committee to investigate,
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52 See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (noting that “[a] legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information—which not infrequently is true—
recourse must be had to others who do possess it”).
53 See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (“This Court
has often noted that the power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws . . . .
Issuance of subpoenas . . . has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its power
to investigate.”); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of the
Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”); McGrain, 273
U.S. at 174 (“We are of opinion that the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”). A complete treatment
of the scope of Congress’s investigative powers is beyond our scope and aim here. For
excellent treatments, see, e.g., Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40, at 542; Jack
M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 126 (2006) (noting
Congress’s tools of investigation are broad and describing them); Marshall, supra note 45,
at 781–82.
54 Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40, at 537 n.45; Marshall, supra note
45, at 786.
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55 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 490–94 (1792); see James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations
on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 170 (1926).
56 Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40, at 537.
57 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 491 (1792); see also id. at 492 (“Mr. Fitzsimons said, he . . . was
in favor of a committee to inquire relative to such objects as come properly under the
cognizance of this House, particularly respecting the expenditures of public money . . . .”).
58 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2029 (2020) (quoting 1 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1760–1775, at 189 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P.
Putnam’s Sons 1892)).
59 Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2030 (citing 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 536 (1792); TELFORD TAYLOR,
GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 24 (1955)).
60 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 417–18 (1813).
61 Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40, at 537.
62 See Landis, supra note 55, at 173–75 (chronicling several investigations into the
expenditure).
63 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 1746 (1810); see also Landis, supra note 55, at 174 (discussing
the inquiry).
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including the powers “to call for such persons, papers, and records, as
may be necessary to assist their inquiries.” 55 The House Committee
obtained not only papers from the War Department, but also the
testimony of General St. Clair and Secretary of War Henry Knox.56 In
response to objections that the House Committee lacked power to
investigate officers under the President’s control, Representative
Williamson voiced what would later be embraced as the broad logic for
oversight: “[A]n inquiry into the expenditure of all public money was
the indispensable duty of this House.”57
In response to the House inquiry, President Washington
consulted with his cabinet, taking care that his response “‘be rightly
conducted’ because it could ‘become a precedent.’” 58 After the
cabinet meeting, President Washington called upon Thomas Jefferson
to negotiate with the House, which narrowed the requested
documents. 59 The House investigative committee ultimately concluded that the unfortunate losses were not attributable to General St.
Clair’s leadership, but reflected structural problems in the efficiency
and quality of the supplies,60 a power that Congress immediately
reallocated from the War Department to the Department of
Treasury. 61
Other early congressional investigations confirmed that
Congress’s power to investigate extends to the full scope of the
expenditure of funds it appropriated.62 In response to allegations that
Brigadier General James Wilkinson had received moneys from Spain,
for instance, Representative Sheffrey defended the congressional duty
of inquiry: “Sir, it is our duty to make this inquiry. . . . We extract
money from the pockets of the people to appropriate to these
purposes, and it is proper to ascertain that those who reap the earnings
of the people are worthy of the public confidence.” 63 Indeed, another
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member of the House threatened that if the President did not remove
General Wilkinson, “we have the power to say that there shall be no
longer an army with a commander at its head” 64—and the resolution
to create an investigative committee carried by a vote of 80 to 29. 65
Congress actively exercised its powers of oversight throughout the
nineteenth century, investigating matters including allegations of
misconduct against the Secretary of the Treasury, 66 alleged violations
of the charter of the Bank of the United States, 67 future President
Jackson’s assumption of powers in the Seminole War (a Senate
inquiry), 68 the administration of the Post Office, 69 and investigations
into the State Department, 70 Interior Department, 71 and the
Smithsonian Institution, 72 among many others. 73
By 1927, the Supreme Court had embraced a broad
understanding of Congress’s oversight functions in McGrain v.
Daugherty, arising from the Senate inquiry into the Teapot Dome
corruption scandal. Attorney General Harry Daugherty came into the
national spotlight for his inaction in response to apparent corruption
arising from allocation of rights to Teapot Dome. 74 The Senate
established an investigative committee to inquire into “the alleged
failure of Harry M. Daugherty, Attorney General of the United States,
to prosecute properly violators of the Sherman Anti-trust Act,” among
other persons and matters. 75 In the course of the Senate committee’s
investigation, it subpoenaed Mally Daugherty—the brother of the
Attorney General and president of a bank. 76 After Mally Daugherty


12/21/2021 11:58:47

C M
Y K

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 76 Side A

64 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 1729 (1810).
65 Landis, supra note 55, at 175.
66 See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 980 (1801) (absolving Secretary of the Treasury Wolcott).
67 S. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1818).
68 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 76 (1818) (adopting resolution in a similar spirit as an earlier
resolution to investigate “clerks or other officers in either of the Departments, or in any
office at the Seat of the General Government, have conducted improperly in their official
duties . . . ,” 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 783, 786 (1818)).
69 See H. JOURNAL, 16th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1820) (adopting resolution to appoint a
committee “to investigate the affairs of the Post Office Department, with power to send for
persons and papers”).
70 CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 733–34 (1846) (inquiring into expenditures by
the State Department in negotiating northeastern boundary).
71 CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 782–83 (1850) (inquiring into Secretary of the
Interior Thomas Ewing’s payment of claims after they had been disallowed by accounting
officers).
72 CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 282–83 (1855) (inquiring into whether the
“Institution has been managed, and its funds expended, in accordance with the law
establishing the institution”).
73 See Landis, supra note 55, at 174–94.
74 Marshall, supra note 45, at 792.
75 273 U.S. 135, 151 (1927).
76 Id. at 152.
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twice failed to appear in response to subpoenas, the Senate authorized
its Sergeant at Arms to take him into custody,77 from which Daugherty
sought relief. The Supreme Court upheld the Senate committee’s
power to compel this testimony in broad terms. Surveying past
congressional practice, the practice of state legislatures, and its own
precedents, the Court cast Congress’s power of inquiry as necessary to
its power to legislate:
We are of opinion that the power of inquiry—with process to
enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. It was so regarded and employed in American
legislatures before the Constitution was framed and ratified. Both
houses of Congress took this view of it early in their history . . . and
both houses have employed the power accordingly up to the
present time. . . . [T]he power of inquiry—with enforcing
process—was regarded and employed as a necessary and
appropriate attribute of the power to legislate—indeed, was treated
as inhering in it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as we
do, that the constitutional provisions which commit the legislative
function to the two houses are intended to include this attribute to
the end that the function may be effectively exercised. 78
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77 Id. at 152–54.
78 Id. at 174–75.
79 Marshall, supra note 45, at 796.
80 See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (“This Court
has often noted that the power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws . . . .
Issuance of subpoenas . . . has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its power
to investigate.”); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of the
Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”); see also Chafetz,
Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40, at 537.
81 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020).
82 See Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40; see also Beermann, supra note
53, at 122–29 (providing account of Congress’s oversight institutions and legislation).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 76 Side B

Under McGrain, the legislative power to investigate extends beyond
seeing information directly relevant to the contemplated legislation,
but also extends to investigation of executive branch wrongdoing. As
William Marshall notes, McGrain “allow[s] specific inquir[y] into
individual wrongdoing even if that wrongdoing could also be subject
to judicial criminal sanction.” 79 In the century since the Court’s
decision in McGrain, it has repeatedly embraced McGrain’s broad
understanding of Congress’s power to investigate, 80 and recently
reaffirmed that broad power in Mazars. 81
Based on that understanding, as Josh Chafetz highlights,82
Congress has enacted legislation that makes it a congressional duty—
which falls upon standing committees in both houses—to oversee the
executive branch. The 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act obliges
each Congress to create standing committees “[t]o assist the Congress
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in appraising the administration of the laws,” which committees “shall
exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the
administrative agencies concerned of any laws.” 83 The 1970 Legislative
Reorganization Act reformulated the duties of standing committees to
“review and study, on a continuing basis, the application,
administration, and execution of those laws . . . within the jurisdiction
of the committee.” 84 These statutes also reorganized the staffing of
standing committees to facilitate the professionalization of standing
committee staff and required the production of biennial oversight
reports on agencies within their jurisdiction. 85 Other statutes emphasize and support Congress’s oversight powers in numerous ways.
Statutes protect whistleblowers, create requirements for departments
to have inspectors general and chief financial officers, 86 and create the
Government Accountability Office (the GAO, formerly the General
Accounting Office). 87
These statutory structures implement the constitutional power of
Congress to exercise oversight. They provide a statutory means
through which the Congress can remain actively involved in checking
and overseeing the activities of the executive branch. In a period of
divided government in which the political party of at least one of the
houses is different from the President, these statutes institutionalize
the power of each house of Congress to conduct its own oversight of
the executive branch.
C. Executive Privilege
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83 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, § 136, 60 Stat. 812, 832 (1946)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 190d(a)); see also Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra
note 40, at 543.
84 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, sec. 118(a)(1),
§ 136(a), 84 Stat. 1140, 1156 (1970) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 190d(a)).
85 Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40, at 543; Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970 § 118.
86 See Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, supra note 40, at 544 (citing Inspector General
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, § 5(b), 92 Stat. 1101, 1103 (1978)).
87 Id. at 543.
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To say that Congress has broad powers to investigate the executive
branch does not imply they are absolute or without limit. From the
earliest congressional investigations, the executive branch has asserted
some prerogative or privilege against disclosure—which we now call
executive privilege. Our focus in this Article is not on resolving any
particular issue of executive privilege. For present purposes, it suffices
to observe that Congress and the executive branch hold different views
of the scope of executive privilege—and both today have come to treat
the judiciary as the final arbiter of claims of executive privilege.
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As a matter of congressional practice, Congress has asserted the
power to demand any information in connection with a properly
authorized oversight hearing. 88 Congress has maintained that documents generated at the staff level may not be subject to any privilege, 89
and that there is no limitation on the subject matter of congressional
inquiries, including matters of foreign relations and international
negotiations. 90 House oversight committee reports routinely cite the
broad language from McGrain and Watkins noted above that treats
congressional investigation powers as broad.91
Executive branch officials have typically expressed a much more
capacious understanding of the scope of executive privilege, extending
to any executive “deliberative communications”92 that form “part of
the decision-making process, or other information important to the
discharge of the Executive Branch’s constitutional responsibilities.”93
The executive branch frequently asserts that any risk of compelled
disclosure would discourage robust and candid dialogue among
executive branch officials. 94 From the perspective of the executive
branch, Congress may compel disclosure and overcome an assertion
of executive privilege “only if it establishes that the subpoenaed
documents are ‘demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the
Committee’s functions.’”95 The executive also takes a much narrower
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88 Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case
of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 479 (1987).
89 Id. at 480 (citing Contempt of Congress: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations and the H. Comm. On Energy & Com. on the Congressional Proceedings Against
Interior Secretary James G. Watt for Withholding Subpenaed [sic] Documents and for Failure to
Answer Questions Relating to Reciprocity Under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 97th Cong. 104
(1981–82) [hereinafter Watt Contempt]).
90 See Watt Contempt, supra note 89, at 116–17; Shane, supra note 88, at 480.
91 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-898, at 12 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 105-416, at 29 (1998);
H.R. REP. NO. 105-792, at 93 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 113-415, pt. 1, at 2 (2014).
92 Assertion of Exec. Privilege over Commc’ns Regarding EPA’s Ozone Air Quality
Standards & Cal.’s Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, 32 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2008) [hereinafter
Special Counsel Assertion]; see also, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege with Respect to
Prosecutorial Documents, 25 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (2001) [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys Assertion];
Assertion of Exec. Privilege with Respect to Clemency Decision, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1–2 (1999)
[hereinafter Clemency Assertion] (opinion of Att’y Gen. Janet Reno).
93 Memorandum from Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, to the Heads
of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 1 (Nov. 4, 1982) (on file with author).
94 Assertion of Exec. Privilege Concerning the Special Counsel’s Interviews of the Vice
President & Senior White House Staff, 32 Op. O.L.C. 7, 8 (2008) [hereinafter EPA
Assertion]; U.S. Attorneys Assertion, supra note 92, at 2; Clemency Assertion, supra note 92,
at 1–4; Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to a Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27, 29–
31 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Assertion] (opinion of Attorney General William French
Smith).
95 Assertion of Exec. Privilege Over Documents Generated in Response to Cong.
Investigation into Operation Fast and Furious, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1, 5 (2012) (quoting Special
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D. Executive Branch Resistance to Congressional Oversight
The executive branch frequently rejects congressional requests
for information that are at the center of Congress’s oversight authority,
and especially so when the information sought might be damaging to
the President or other high-level executive branch offices. Of course,
that is often the information that is most useful to Congress, whether
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Counsel Assertion, supra note 92, at 3–4); see also, e.g., U.S. Attorneys Assertion, supra note
92, at 2 (same); Clemency Assertion, supra note 92, at 2 (same).
96 1981 Assertion, supra note 94, at 30; see also, e.g., Special Counsel Assertion, supra
note 92, at 11; U.S. Attorneys Assertion, supra note 92, at 2–3.
97 See Shane, supra note 88, at 465.
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view of Congress’s oversight functions, as reflected in a 1981 opinion
of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of
Justice: “[C]ongressional oversight of Executive Branch actions is
justifiable only as a means of facilitating the legislative task of enacting,
amending, or repealing laws,” 96 a list that seems to exclude broad
oversight of administration, whether to identify simple
maladministration or outright corruption. The 1981 opinion also does
not expressly mention oversight of the executive’s expenditure of
appropriated funds—a central element of congressional understanding of its oversight powers since the House investigation of the St. Clair
expedition.
When confronted with these conflicting views of executive
privilege and its relationship to the scope of legitimate congressional
oversight, it is tempting to assume that there is only one correct
account and to associate that correct answer with the answer the court
gives in any particular case. In this context, however, it is more useful,
as Peter Shane observes, to understand each branch as maintaining its
own independent doctrine of executive privilege, which deserves coequal status with those of other branches. 97 As a practical matter,
Congress and the President continue to take different positions on the
legitimate scope of executive privilege and both generally acquiesce in
treating judicial determinations as final. These dueling assertions of
executive privilege are one of the most persistent strains of
departmentalism between the branches.
For our inquiry, it is not necessary to define or take a position on
the precise parameters of executive privilege. All that is necessary is
the fact, as illustrated by the examples in the next section, that the
executive branch continues to assert executive privilege in ways that
are broader than the courts allow. As a result, absent enforceable,
timely court orders, the executive has been able to effectively thwart
congressional oversight that courts would permit.
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for enacting timely remedies, discouraging waste or corruption, or
exposing the scope and depth of the problem in a way necessary for
the public to hold the President or the administration’s political party
accountable in elections.
The following three examples illustrate how the executive branch
is able to evade Congress’s request for information, even when
formalized in a subpoena and a contempt citation. In each case,
Congress either never received full information in response to its
request or received that information only years later, when it had lost
much of its value for timely reform or accountability. One is from the
Democrat-controlled House investigating President Reagan’s
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the second is from a
Republican-controlled House investigating President Obama’s
Department of Justice; and the third is from a Democrat-controlled
House investigating President Trump’s White House Counsel.
1. Reagan Administration EPA and a Democratic House: The Anne
Gorsuch Affair
A dispute between the Reagan administration and the House
provoked one of the most extensive and consequential oversight
battles between the House and the executive branch. The battles were
fought over information related to the EPA’s handling of Superfund
sites, but the conflict ultimately affected not only environmental
policymaking, but also Supreme Court jurisprudence. 98 In 1981,
President Reagan named Anne Gorsuch, later Anne Burford (and the
mother of Justice Neil Gorsuch), as Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency. 99 Administrator Gorsuch’s efforts
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98 OLC has asserted that Congress cannot pursue a criminal contempt of Congress
action and/or Congress’s inherent contempt powers against an executive branch official
who is claiming executive privilege at the written direction of the President. See Prosecution
for Contempt of Cong. of an Exec. Branch Off. Who Has Asserted a Claim of Exec. Privilege,
8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 137 (1984) (“Congress could obtain a judicial resolution of the
underlying privilege claim and vindicate its asserted right to obtain any documents by a civil
action for enforcement of a congressional subpoena.”); see also Response to Cong. Requests
for Info. Regarding Decisions Made Under the Indep. Couns. Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 68, 88
(1986) (“[A]lthough the civil enforcement route has not been tried by the House, it would
appear to be a viable option.”). This effectively leaves as the only available option pursuit
of enforcement via a civil proceeding in district court.
99 For an overview of this dispute, see TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34097,
CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS:
LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 35 (2017); see also JONATHAN LASH, KATHERINE
GILLMAN & DAVID SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK
ON THE ENVIRONMENT (1984); Cally Carswell, How Reagan’s EPA Chief Paved the Way for
Trump’s Assault on the Agency, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 21, 2017), https://newrepublic.com
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to cut the EPA budget and reduce environmental enforcement
provoked oversight activity by the House Public Works and
Transportation Committee and the Energy and Commerce
Committee, chaired by Rep. John Dingell (D-Michigan). 100 In the fall
of 1982, the Committee subpoenaed EPA documents after concerns
that the Superfund program, run by Assistant Administrator Rita
Lavelle, relied on partisan political considerations in its enforcement,
including delaying settlements that might have helped the Democratic
Governor of California running for reelection and reaching sweetheart
deals in other states. 101 The House also investigated allegations of
document destruction, and Lavelle ultimately went to jail for lying to
Congress. 102
In response to the House inquiries, the EPA sought advice from
the OLC at the Department of Justice on the scope of its obligations to
disclose information to Congress in response to these requests. After
negotiations with the House Subcommittees collapsed, the
Department of Justice concluded that the EPA could assert executive
privilege and withhold documents found in “open investigative files”
reflecting “enforcement strategy.” 103 Based on this advise, President
Reagan directed Administrator Gorsuch to assert executive privilege in
response to the House subpoenas.104 Administrator Gorsuch followed
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/article/141471/reagans-epa-chief-paved-way-trumps-assault-agency
[https://perma.cc
/ZZ8A-ALZ4].
100 See GARVEY, supra note 99, at 35; COMM. ON PUB. WORKS & TRANSP.,
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ANNE M. GORSUCH, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FOR WITHHOLDING SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, H.R. REP. NO. 97-968, at 15 (1982) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GORSUCH].
101 See INVESTIGATION OF THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENTT OF JUSTICE IN THE
WITHHOLDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY DOCUMENTS FROM CONGRESS IN
1982–83, H.R. REP. NO. 99-435, at 44 (1985); CONGRESSIONAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
GORSUCH, supra note 100; see also Lois Romano, Rita Lavelle, Dumped, WASH. POST (Mar. 5,
1983),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1983/03/05/rita-lavelledumped/45256854-7ca3-4df4-8031-5a56793be499/ [https://perma.cc/TJ3F-VHKT]
102 See GARVEY, supra note 99, at 35; Philip Shabecoff, Rita Lavelle Gets 6-Month Prison
Term and Is Fined $10,000 for Perjury, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 1984), https://www.nytimes.com
/1984/01/10/us/rita-lavelle-gets-6-month-term-and-is-fined-10000-for-perjury.html
[https://perma.cc/8YJZ-L432].
103 Assertion of Executive Privilege in Response to Congressional Demands for Law
Enforcement Files, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 374, 376, 378 (1982) (quoting Memorandum from
Thomas E. Kauper, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., Dep’t of Just., to
Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Couns. to the President (Dec. 19, 1969)).
104 See Memorandum from President Reagan, to Anne Burford, Adm’r, Env’t Prot.
Agency (Nov. 30, 1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 97-968, at 42. During the course of these
events, Administrator Gorsuch was married, and became Anne Burford. Douglas Martin,
Anne Gorsuch Burford, E.P.A. Chief, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2004), https://
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President Reagan’s directive, and the House of Representatives ended
up voting to hold her in contempt for failure to comply with the
subpoena. 105 It was an historic first contempt citation for a cabinetlevel official. The Department of Justice sought to enjoin the transmission of the citation for contempt to the U.S. Attorney for the District
of Columbia, 106 but even though that failed, the U.S. Attorney declined
to prosecute Administrator Gorsuch to enforce the subpoena.107
Gorsuch also filed a civil suit against the House of Representatives
seeking a declaration of the validity of her assertion of executive
privilege, which the court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.108 Soon
thereafter her civil suit was dismissed, and officials recognized that
documents regarding the use of partisan considerations in Superfund
enforcement had been improperly withheld from the House
Committees. The ultimate release of those documents prompted
further negotiations in which the House agreed to withdraw the
contempt citation, 109 Administrator Gorsuch ultimately resigned, 110
and Rita Lavelle was fired and convicted. 111
The executive branch’s broad assertion of executive privilege
delayed the House investigation for more than a year—and required
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www.nytimes.com/2004/07/22/us/anne-gorsuch-burford-62-reagan-epa-chief-dies.html
[https://perma.cc/U979-LTH5]. I refer to her as Anne Gorsuch throughout. See H.R.
REP. NO. 97-968, at 42.
105 H.R. Res. 632, 97th Cong., 128 CONG. REC. 31776 (1982); see 2 U.S.C. § 192
(providing that a person subpoenaed who refuses to produce papers upon any matter
under inquiry of the House or any of its committees shall be guilty of a misdemeanor);
§ 194 (providing that following contempt the Speaker of the House is to certify the
contempt citation to the U.S. Attorney, who is required to bring the matter to the grand
jury).
106 See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
Despite the mandatory language of 2 U.S.C. § 194, the Office of Legal Counsel has asserted
that a U.S. Attorney has the discretion to decline to present a congressional criminal
contempt citation to a grand jury. See Prosecution for Contempt of Cong. of an Exec.
Branch Off. Who Has Asserted a Claim of Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 137 (1984)
(“Congress could obtain a judicial resolution of the underlying privilege claim and
vindicate its asserted right to obtain any documents by a civil action for enforcement of a
congressional subpoena.”).
107 See Examining and Reviewing the Procedures That Were Taken by the Office of the U.S.
Attorney for the District of Columbia in Their Implementation of a Contempt Citation That Was Voted
by the Full House of Representatives Against the Then Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, Anne Gorsuch Burford: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Pub. Works & Transp., 98th
Cong. 30 (1983) (statement of Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Attorney, District of Columbia)
108 Kevin M. Stack, The Story of Morrison v. Olson: The Independent Counsel and
Independent Agencies in Watergate’s Wake, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 401, 418
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
109 GARVEY, supra note 99, at 35.
110 See CONGRESSIONAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GORSUCH, supra note 100; Martin, supra
note 104.
111 See GARVEY, supra note 99, at 35; see also Shabecoff, supra note 102.
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consuming floor time in the House to hold the Administrator of the
EPA in contempt. Ted Olson’s own statements to the committee
regarding the scope of EPA’s disclosures resulted in the appointment
of an independent counsel to investigate his conduct, ultimately
resulting in the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the Independent
Counsel Statute in Morrison v. Olson. 112
2. Obama Administration Department of Justice and a Republican
House: Fast and Furious
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112 487 U.S. 654 (1988). For a detailed account of these facts, and the ensuing
litigation, see Stack, supra note 108, at 401.
113 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM AND S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., FAST AND FURIOUS: THE ANATOMY OF A FAILED OPERATION, PART
I OF III 6 (Comm. Print 2012) [hereinafter FAST AND FURIOUS, PART I].
114 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM AND S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS:
FUELING CARTEL VIOLENCE 4 (Comm. Print 2011).
115 See FAST AND FURIOUS, PART I, supra note 113, at 16.
116 See id. at 15.
117 See id. at 5.
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In the summer of 2009, the Obama administration changed its
enforcement strategy to stem the illegal flow of weapons from the U.S.
to Mexican drug cartels, shifting emphasis from “merely seizing
firearms” to identifying and targeting the broader networks
involved. 113 A significant focus of the strategy was a Phoenix-based
operation called “Operation Fast and Furious,” which was designed to
identify gun smuggling networks through the tracking of strawpurchased firearms. 114 The operation involved the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), a law enforcement agency within the
DOJ, declining to make isolated arrests of individual gun smugglers to
create opportunities to make arrests of central figures that could
cripple gun trafficking networks. 115 Because of the inherent risks
involved in allowing guns to be carried unlawfully into Mexico, the
initiative generated internal concerns as early as December 2009.116
ATF ended the program in January 2011 after guns traced to the
operation were found on the scene of the fatal shooting of U.S. Border
Patrol Agent Brian Terry.
Agent Terry’s death prompted a congressional investigation by
the Republican-controlled House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform. 117 The House investigation became one of the
most contentious in the Obama administration. After the Department
of Justice refused to turn over some of the documents sought by the
Committee, the House issued a subpoena to Attorney General Holder
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on October 11, 2011. 118 Holder partially complied, handing over thousands of documents, internal notes and emails, but still withheld
thousands of key documents and requested that President Obama
assert executive privilege over all pertinent documents. 119 President
Obama asserted the privilege, but the Department of Justice never
produced privilege logs. After continued wrangling, in 2012, the
House voted to hold Holder in contempt of Congress and authorize a
civil suit to enforce its subpoenas. 120 Not until January 19, 2016, did
the House obtain a federal court order enforcing the production of
documents and a privilege log, 121 giving Congress key information on
the role of the Department of Justice in the operation.
The House released reports in July 2012, focusing on the
leadership at the ATF and lack of coordination among enforcement
agencies, 122 and in October 2012, examining the role the Department
of Justice played in the operation, and its culpability for the death of
Agent Terry. 123 But the final report was not released until June 2017,
after the federal court had ordered disclosures from the
Department. 124 The 2017 report reached scathing conclusions about
the Department of Justice’s resistance to oversight, claiming the DOJ
knew about the problems with the program early on, strategically
withheld information from Congress, failed to produce many relevant
documents requested in subpoenas, and formed a media strategy
designed to impede oversight and minimize public scrutiny. 125 By the
time of these court-ordered disclosures, the operation had been
terminated years before, the central figures involved in managing it
were no longer leading the DOJ, and President Trump had taken over
the executive branch.
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118 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM AND S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 115TH CONG., FAST AND FURIOUS: OBSTRUCTION OF CONGRESS BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PART III 3 (Comm. Print 2017) [hereinafter FAST AND FURIOUS,
PART III].
119 See id. at 4.
120 Id.
121 Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v. Lynch, 156
F. Supp. 3d 101, 120 (D.D.C. 2016) (ordering production of privilege logs among other
documents).
122 See FAST AND FURIOUS, PART III, supra note 118, at 3.
123 Id. See generally STAFF OF H. COMM ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM AND S. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., FAST AND FURIOUS: THE ANATOMY OF A FAILED
OPERATION, PART II OF III 90–104 (Comm. Print 2012) [hereinafter FAST AND FURIOUS,
PART II] (presenting the connections between Justice Department officials and the death
of Agent Terry).
124 See FAST AND FURIOUS, PART III, supra note 118; Fast and Furious, Six Years Later:
Hearing Before the H. Comm on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 115th Cong. (2017).
125 FAST AND FURIOUS, PART III, supra note 118, at 16–22.
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3. Trump Administration Commerce Secretary and a Democratic
House: The Citizenship Question on the Census
On numerous occasions, the Trump administration refused to
comply with House subpoenas for documents or testimony or provided
false or misleading testimony. The House actions have included demands for many types of documents and testimony, ranging from
standard House oversight activities to impeachment proceedings. The
administration frequently resisted congressional oversight, including a
blanket rejection of the House’s authority to investigate the executive
branch in connection with the 2019 impeachment inquiry.126
Just to pick one example, the House Committee on Oversight and
Reform issued a request for documents regarding the Department of
Commerce’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census
in February 2019, and it followed that request with a subpoena in April
2019. Although some documents were produced in response to the
subpoena, the Department of Justice declined to permit John Gore,
the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, and Attorney General William Barr
to answer all of the investigation’s requests. 127 On July 17, 2019, the
House held both Secretary Ross and Attorney General Barr in
contempt for failing to comply with the House Oversight Committee’s
subpoenas to produce documents. 128 The Department of Justice
adhered to its practice of not pursuing criminal enforcement of these
officials’ contempt of Congress, 129 but a judicial challenge to the
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126 Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Couns. to the President, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker,
House of Representatives, and Adam B. Schiff, Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm.
on Intel., and Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, House Foreign Affs. Comm. and Elijah E.
Cummings, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Reform 7 (Oct. 8, 2019) [hereinafter
Letter from Pat A. Cipollone], https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/letter-fromwhite-house-counsel-pat-cipollone-to-house-leaders/0e1845e5-5c19-4e7a-ab4b-9d591a5f
da7b/ [https://perma.cc/AQX6-76AK] (“Given that your inquiry lacks any legitimate
constitutional foundation, any pretense of fairness, or even the most elementary due
process protections, the Executive Branch cannot be expected to participate in it.”); see also
Donald Trump’s Obstruction of Congressional Oversight, AM. OVERSIGHT, https://www
.americanoversight.org/investigation/donald-trumps-obstruction-of-congressionaloversight [https://perma.cc/7FYL-H5GQ] (last updated July 31, 2020) (cataloging Trump
administration resistance to congressional oversight).
127 Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Elijah E.
Cummings, Chairman, House Comm. Oversight and Reform (Apr. 24, 2019); Letter from
Stephen E. Boyd, supra note 2; Andrew Desiderio, DOJ, Commerce Reject Dem Subpoenas for
Census Docs, POLITICO (June 6, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/06/barrross-census-democrats-house-1356569 [https://perma.cc/4EGR-A5U4].
128 H.R. Res. 497, 116th Cong. (2019).
129 David Shortell, DOJ Won’t Prosecute Contempt Citation Against Barr and Ross, CNN
(July
24,
2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/24/politics/doj-contempt-wontprosecute-barr-ross/index.html [https://perma.cc/G7BK-62UC].
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decision to add a citizenship question proceeded. On June 27, 2019,
the Supreme Court held that the Secretary’s decision to include the
citizenship question was unlawful because it had been justified on a
pretextual ground. 130 In late November 2019, the House Committee
filed a federal lawsuit seeking to compel Ross and Barr to produce
documents in response to its subpoenas related to the plan to add a
citizenship question. 131 This case remained tied up in the D.C. District
Court beyond the November 2020 election pending the results of the
House’s suit against Donald F. McGahn, former White House
Counsel. 132
II.

ENFORCING OVERSIGHT

A. Congress’s Enforcement Toolkit: A Problem of Incentives
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130 Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019).
131 Complaint at 83, Comm. on Oversight & Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v.
Barr, No. 19-cv-03557 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2019).
132 Minute Order, Comm. on Oversight & Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v.
Barr, No. 19-cv-03557 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2020). President Biden has restored the longstanding principle that apportionment includes all persons, not just citizens. See Exec.
Order No. 13,986, 86 Fed. Reg. 7015, 7016 (Jan. 20, 2021).
133 Other strategies include not acting on the President’s nominations, simply not
acting on any of the President’s legislative proposals or needs, or reducing an official’s
salary. See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1152–
53 (2009).
134 JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017) [hereinafter CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION].
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As the examples just discussed illustrate, Congress’s approach to
enforcing its subpoena powers is failing. The executive branch
routinely thwarts Congress’s legitimate interest in information
required for oversight. Congress has primarily relied on four tools for
enforcing its subpoenas against executive branch officials: inherent
contempt, criminal contempt, civil litigation to enforce contempt
sanctions, and threats of funding cuts. It is worth considering why
these tools have not been successful in overcoming executive branch
resistance to subpoenas. 133
Congress has a long-recognized inherent contempt power,
including the power to hold in custody those in contempt, although
this power has not been actively invoked in decades. In Congress’s
Constitution and earlier work, Josh Chafetz has unearthed and given
prominence to the scope of Congress’s use of its inherent contempt
power through the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth
century. 134 Throughout that period, Congress’s inherent contempt
power was the primary means by which it would enforce compliance
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135 Id. at 175.
136 Id. at 176–77.
137 Id. at 177–78.
138 Id. at 185.
139 See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F.
Supp. 2d 53, 83 (D.D.C. 2008); see also CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, supra note
134, at 187 (discussing same).
140 See Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, §§ 1 & 3, 11 Stat. 155, 155–56 (1857) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 194).
141 2 U.S.C. § 194 (2018).
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with its subpoenas. As Chafetz explores, Congress used its inherent
contempt power to bring into custody members of the executive
branch for contempt, including James Fry, the Provost Marshall
General of the Army (1866), 135 George Seward, for conduct when he
was consul general to Shanghai (1879), 136 and Snowden Marshall, U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York (1916). 137 The House
detained Seward for failing to produce subpoenaed documents.138
Since Watergate, however, Congress has allowed its inherent
contempt powers to atrophy. Congress has acquiesced in the idea that
directing its Sergeant at Arms to detain an executive branch official
would prompt an unseemly constitutional crisis, in which the Sergeant
at Arms would be face-to-face with a U.S. Marshal to take custody of an
executive official. 139 Nor has the idea that Congress could impose fines
on those who fail to appear in response to subpoenas gained much
traction, although in principle it could be an effective means of selfhelp. Without a structure for fines and absent any appetite for using
its power to hold executive branch officials in custody, inherent
contempt powers are not a viable answer to enforcing Congress’s
oversight powers.
A second enforcement mechanism—criminal liability for
contempt of Congress—fails because it provides no protection when
the President is of a different party from the party that controls either
the House or the Senate. In 1857, Congress enacted a statute that
attached criminal liability to contempt of Congress, and imposed a
duty upon the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia to bring the
matter before a grand jury. 140 The current version of the statute
imposes a duty on the U.S. Attorney in any district in which the
individual in contempt of a congressional subpoena is located “to
bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.”141 The
vulnerabilities of this criminal contempt sanction are well illustrated in
the cases discussed above. Although Administrator Gorsuch, Attorney
General Holder, Secretary Ross and Attorney General Barr were all
held in contempt for failure to testify or cooperate with House
oversight, the Department of Justice declined to bring the contempt
issue to a grand jury in any of these cases based on its policy that each
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142 The Department of Justice has recently initiated prosecution of former Trump
administration official Steven Bannon for his refusal to comply with a House subpoena
regarding the events of January 6, 2020. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Stephen K. Bannon
Indicted for Contempt of Congress (Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/stephen-k-bannon-indicted-contempt-congress [https://perma.cc/R34A-PMQD]. In this
case, the House and President are in alignment.
143 CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 134, at 192.
144 See Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 542 F.3d
909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
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of them validly invoked executive privilege and therefore
noncompliance did not constitute a crime. The Department of Justice
reached the same conclusion regarding the House’s finding that both
former White House Counsel Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten, White
House Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush, were in contempt
for failure to disclose information about the firings of U.S. Attorneys.
The criminal contempt statute makes the Department of Justice a
necessary mover in enforcing congressional subpoenas against
executive branch officials. As a practical matter, that makes criminal
enforcement of Congress’s subpoena powers highly unlikely whenever
the President is of a different party than the house of Congress holding
the official in contempt. 142
A third conventional enforcement tool is filing a civil action in
federal court to force the executive official to comply, often in a
declaratory judgment proceeding. The value of a civil action is that it
has the potential to convert a congressional subpoena into a court
order, which creates the risk of a contempt of court sanction. Civil
litigation has become the nearly exclusive means of enforcement of
Congress’s oversight powers, but it is also the most recent enforcement
mechanism. Interestingly, scholars have found no pre-Watergate case
in which a house of Congress became a plaintiff in a court proceeding
seeking to enforce a congressional subpoena against an executive
branch official. 143 Watergate prompted the courts to adjudicate a
claim that an executive official was in contempt of Congress for failure
to comply with a subpoena—and that resolution has stuck. Yet, as the
examples in the previous part illustrate, seeking judicial enforcement
of a subpoena, at least in our current system, works very poorly for
Congress.
The most important reasons should be no surprise at this point:
judicial enforcement involves a lot of time, and delay thwarts oversight.
Congressional subpoenas are only valid for the two-year term of the
Congress that issued them, 144 and even the most well-managed
Congress will take several months to organize, identify the testimony
or documents it needs, receive a rejection to an informal oversight
demand, negotiate, and vote to issue a subpoena. After the subpoena
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is issued, almost any executive administration worth its salt can engage
in eighteen months to two years of litigation. 145 The executive official
generally has the benefit of legal representation by the Department of
Justice, on whose advice the claim of executive privilege is made. 146
And the hoops and delays to enforcing congressional subpoenas are
significant, and they continue to develop. The defendant, through the
Department of Justice, can litigate over standing, 147 the political
question doctrine, 148 other aspects of federal jurisdiction,149 the
existence of a cause of action, 150 the scope of executive privilege, 151 the
scope of the documents or testimony subject to the subpoena, and the
officials to whom disclosures should be made. Each round of motions
and appeals clicks down the clock, diminishing the value of the
information sought to Congress. 152
Finally, Congress can use its appropriations powers to punish or
discipline agencies for failure to comply with its oversight requests
through funding sanctions. A 2014 House Oversight and Government
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145 See GARVEY, supra note 99, at 53 (concluding that “although it appears that
Congress may be able to enforce its own subpoenas through a declaratory civil action,
relying on this mechanism to enforce a subpoena directed at an executive official may prove
an inadequate means of protecting congressional prerogatives due to the time required to
achieve a final, enforceable ruling in the case”). For a 2019 media discussion of Trump-era
refusals to testify, see Zachary B. Wolf, Contempt of Congress Now Feels Like an Everyday Thing.
It Wasn’t Always So, CNN (June 26, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/26/politics
/contempt-of-congress-list/index.html [https://perma.cc/MG3T-4XK5].
146 See Wolf, supra note 145.
147 Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d
755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (holding that the House Judiciary Committee has
standing to enforce its own subpoena).
148 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993) (holding that “opening the
door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments would
‘expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.’”) (quoting
Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
149 See Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp.
2d 53, 64 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that since the subpoena power at bar “derive[d] implicitly
from Article I of the Constitution, this case ar[ose] under the Constitution for purposes of
§ 1331 [subject matter jurisdiction]”).
150 Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 973 F.3d
121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2020), vacated pending reh’g en banc, Per Curiam Order, No. 19-5331 (Oct.
15, 2020) (en banc) (holding the House Committee lacked a cause of action to enforce its
subpoena), dismissed, Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal, and Consent Motion to Vacate Panel
Opinion, No. 19-5331 (June 10, 2021).
151 See Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, supra note 2.
152 See Josh Chafetz, Nixon/Trump: Strategies of Judicial Aggrandizement, 110 Geo. L.J.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 22) (on file with authors) (observing that “the judiciary
felt none of the urgency to decide the Trump cases that it had felt to decide the Nixon
ones” and that “over 450 days elapsed between the issuance of the congressional
subpoenas . . . and the Supreme Court’s decision in Mazars”); see, e.g., Trump v. Mazars
USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
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Reform Committee investigation into whether the IRS had more
intrusively scrutinized the applications for the tax-exempt status of
conservative than liberal groups provides a rich example. 153 The
Committee subpoenaed Lois G. Lerner, the director of the IRS division
on exempt organizations. In lieu of testimony, Ms. Lerner submitted
a voluntary statement to the Committee. The Committee later
determined that her voluntary statement waived her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and continued to insist on her
testimony before the Committee. She refused, and the Committee
recommended that the House hold her in contempt of Congress, 154
which the House did in May of 2014. 155 The House reported its finding
of contempt to the U.S. Attorney for a criminal contempt prosecution,
and the Department of Justice declined to prosecute, 156 just as it did
with the contempt citation of Attorney General Holder.
As opposed to merely leaving the controversy as a stand-off, the
House retaliated, using its appropriations powers. In the 2014 annual
appropriations, the House cut the IRS budget by $345 million 157 and
included a limitation rider directly addressing the alleged wrongdoing
in the IRS: “None of the funds made available in this Act may be used
by the Internal Revenue Service to target groups for regulatory scrutiny
based on their ideological beliefs.” 158 The reduction in IRS funding
and inclusion of the limitations rider clearly conveyed Congress’s
disapproval of the IRS’s handling of conservative groups’ tax-exempt
applications and with it, the House’s disapproval of Ms. Lerner’s
refusal to comply with its subpoena. The appropriations rider was
unsuccessful, however, in forcing additional testimony.
A threat to reduce an agency’s funding may be a good tool for
reorienting the agency’s substantive priorities, but it is a very blunt tool
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153 See H.R. REP. NO. 113-415, at 3–7 (2014).
154 Id. at 2.
155 H.R. Res. 574, 113th Cong. (2014), 160 CONG. REC. H3902–09, H3919–22 (daily
ed. May 7, 2014) (enacted).
156 Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Kevin Brady,
Chairman, House Comm. on Ways & Means, and Peter J. Roskam, House Subcomm. On
Tax Pol’y (Sept. 8, 2017), https://republicans-waysandmeansforms.house.gov/uploaded
files/09.08.17_doj_response_to_criminal_referral_request.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E2MN2MT].
157 Ed O’Keefe, Congressional Leaders Agree on $1.01 Trillion Spending Bill, WASH. POST.,
Dec. 10, 2014, at A3.
158 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235, div. E, § 108, 128 Stat. 2332, 2338 (2014); Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. E, § 108, 129 Stat. 2242,
2430 (2015) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)) (stating the general
prohibition on unauthorized spending); § 1350 (providing criminal fines and up to two
years of imprisonment for violating § 1341(a)).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B



43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 84 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B67$&.B(7B$/BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2021]

OVERSIGHT RIDERS

30

157

for enforcing more disclosure. 159 Because the sanction must follow the
noncooperation, it arrives too late to increase the incentives for
disclosure among executive branch officials. The funding reduction
was targeted at the agency, not the individual, and presumably affected
the ability of the IRS to do its work. It did not bring Ms. Lerner back
to a congressional hearing room. Although officials may have a
general sense of loyalty to their agency or office, a funding cut is still
impersonal—it may or may not directly affect the individual whose
testimony Congress sought.
B. Targeting Appropriations Sanctions to Noncooperation: Oversight Riders
The Lerner-IRS conflict suggests another tool for oversight: the
use of appropriations riders specifically targeted to obstruction of
Congress’s oversight powers—what we call oversight riders.
Appropriations riders, also called limitation riders, are provisions
in appropriations legislation, framed in the negative, that prohibit or
limit agency spending on particular programs or for particular
purposes. 160 Riders allow Congress to target particular activities the
agencies may otherwise have authority to do and make those agency
actions unlawful by denying funding to support those activities or
projects. Congress has used riders to prohibit specific agency policies,
actions, and projects. 161 Under House and Senate rules, in general,
riders may not change the existing law; they may only disallow agency
activity within the period of fiscal appropriation.162
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159 Cf. MOLLY E. REYNOLDS & PHILIP A. WALLACH, AM. ENTER. INST., DOES THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTROL THE POWER OF THE PURSE? 6–7 (2020) (noting 2006 threat
by Senate Appropriations Committee to cut funding for Office of Drug Control Policy based
in part on the Office’s “lethargy and the inadequate information provided” and noting
defunding is a “crude[] means of putting agencies on notice” (quoting S. Rep. No. 109293, at 189 (2006))).
160 Devins, supra note 28, at 461; Metzger, supra note 19, at 1093.
161 Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic
Policy Decisions, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 766, 769 (2010).
162 House Rule XXI, Clause 2(d) permits riders or limitations in appropriations bills,
but House Rule XXI, Clause 2(c) prohibits provisions which change the law (called
legislative provisions in this context) in appropriations bills. While the House does allow,
under the Holman Rule, legislative provisions to be included in appropriations bills if they
are germane and reduce expenditures, the basic rule is that riders are allowed if they limit
or cap use of funds so long as they do not “chang[e] the existing law.” See Jacqueline Lash
& Brady Cassis, The Use and Misuse of Appropriations Riders 6–9 (Harvard L. Sch. Briefing
Papers on Fed. Budget Pol’y, Briefing Paper No. 50) (May 10, 2015). A member may raise
a point of order to object to a rider as violating the clause 2(c) prohibition on including
legislative provisions, at which point the presiding officer will need to rule on the point of
order. See id. at 8. See generally Devins, supra note 29, at 462.
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Many of Congress’s most controversial policy positions have been
embodied in riders, 163 ranging from limiting the work of the Civil
Rights Commission 164 to prohibiting transfers of prisoners from
Guantanamo and prohibiting prosecution for marijuana possession in
states that legalized it. 165 Although these riders have been attached to
appropriations bills since the middle of the nineteenth century, 166 they
have been increasingly relied upon since the 1990s. 167 They may
appear in the general provisions applicable to an individual title of an
appropriations act, in the general provisions applicable to the entire
act, or they may be enacted separately. 168 As we explain below, the turn
to riders, as opposed to legislation, is a pragmatic one. The pressure
to pass appropriations on an annual basis means that riders attached
to appropriations have a much greater chance of enactment in our
currently polarized Congress than reform legislation.
The basic motivation of an oversight rider is to find a way to
increase the pressure on members of the Executive Branch to provide
information to Congress. An oversight rider would do so by denying
appropriations for activities that obstruct Congress’s oversight
functions generally and response to congressional subpoenas in
particular. We have identified one existing rider that fits this general
description, and modelled on it, we propose another oversight rider
that specifically targets noncompliance with congressional subpoenas.
1. The Section 713 Rider
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163 See Devins, supra note 29, at 463.
164 Id. at 456–57.
165 See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div.
C, §§ 8110–11, 128 Stat. 86, 131 (2014) (appropriations rider precluding transfer of
detainees from Guantanamo); Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. B, § 542, 129 Stat. 2286, 2332–33 (2015)
(barring the DOJ from prosecuting medical marijuana offences in listed states). See generally
Price, infra note 216, at 373–78 (discussing these examples).
166 Devins, supra note 29, at 462.
167 See Metzger, supra note 19, at 1093–94 (documenting increased reliance on
appropriations riders); MacDonald, supra note 161, at 1 (same); Devins, supra note 29, at
462–63 (documenting increase in riders).
168 STIFF, supra note 30, at 57.
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Since 2003, Congress has repeatedly enacted in appropriations
legislation a rider that prohibits use of appropriated funds to pay for
the salary of any officer or employee who prevents or threatens to
prevent an employee from having any communications, written or
oral, with a member of Congress or committee related to the subject
matter of the official’s employment. The Section 713 rider provides in
full:
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No part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act
shall be available for the payment of the salary of any officer or
employee of the Federal Government, who—
(1) prohibits or prevents, or attempts or threatens to prohibit
or prevent, any other officer or employee of the Federal
Government from having any direct oral or written communication
or contact with any Member, committee, or subcommittee of the
Congress in connection with any matter pertaining to the
employment of such other officer or employee or pertaining to the
department or agency of such other officer or employee in any way,
irrespective of whether such communication or contact is at the
initiative of such other officer or employee or in response to the
request or inquiry of such Member, committee, or subcommittee;
or
(2) removes, suspends from duty without pay, demotes, reduces
in rank, seniority, status, pay, or performance or efficiency rating,
denies promotion to, relocates, reassigns, transfers, disciplines, or
discriminates in regard to any employment right, entitlement, or
benefit, or any term or condition of employment of, any other
officer or employee of the Federal Government, or attempts or
threatens to commit any of the foregoing actions with respect to
such other officer or employee, by reason of any communication or
contact of such other officer or employee with any Member,
committee, or subcommittee of the Congress as described in
paragraph (1). 169
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169 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No.
116-260, div. E, § 713, 134 Stat. 1380, 1432–33 (2020).
170 See Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, Gov’t Accountability Off., to Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg et al., Gov’t Accountability Off. Decision B-30291 at 6–7 (Sept. 7, 2004)
[hereinafter GAO 2004 Letter] (discussing President Roosevelt’s Exec. Order No. 1142
(1906) (although appearing to quote a different order, see, e.g., 48 CONG. REC. 5223 (1912)
(speech of Rep. John A. Moon)), President Taft’s Exec. Order No. 1514 (1909) (appearing
to conflate President Taft’s Executive Order No. 1142 from 1909 and his Executive Order
No. 1514 from 1912, 48 CONG. REC. 5223 (1912) (speech of Rep. John A. Moon)) and
Congressional response in the Lloyd-La Follette Act, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912) (letter
giving a different citation for the legislation)).
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The prohibition is strikingly broad. It applies government-wide (funds
appropriated “in this or any other Act”), encompasses any efforts by
supervisors to thwart their employees or subordinates from
communicating freely with Congress, and applies to any employment
sanction that might follow from such communications.
Although the roots of the rider could be traced to Congress’s
responses to executive orders issued by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt
and William Howard Taft imposing restrictions on communications
between executive branch officials and Congress, 170 its most immediate
antecedent is Congress’s response to a 1970s directive of the
Postmaster General ordering that the Post Office’s Congressional
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Liaison Office be the sole voice of the Post Office in communicating
with Congress. 171 Members of Congress objected to the idea that they
would be prevented from communicating with lower level officials in
the Postal Service. 172 In response, the Senate drafted a rider that
applied only to the Postal Service, and the House a version that applied
government-wide. 173 In 1997, the conference committee adopted the
House version, 174 and the government-wide prohibition has been
frequently re-enacted in appropriations bills. 175
At least in principle, the Section 713 rider has features that help
to overcome the structural shortcomings of Congress’s conventional
arsenal of tools for conducting oversight. First and most obviously, the
rider creates a risk of sanction that is personal to the individual: a
supervisor who thwarts a subordinate’s communications with Congress
faces the prospect of a salary reduction. Second, the sanction is public,
making it an embarrassing part of the public record for the individual.
Third, the sanction does not require any action by the Department of
Justice. Rather, a member of Congress may initiate a request to the
Government Accountability Office for an investigation. 176 The GAO
will then conduct an investigation, and if wrongdoing is found, the
GAO will direct the agency to claw back the salary paid during the
relevant time period. 177 As a result, Congress can initiate a process that
can result in a public sanction for impeding access to lower-level
officials without requiring resort to litigation in court or dependance
on Department of Justice enforcement. Further, the sanction risk has
greater duration. Once the violation occurs, the risk of enforcement
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171 See id. at 5 (reported in 117 CONG. REC. 151 (1971))
172 Id.
173 Id. at 4 (comparing S. 1023, 105th Cong. § 506 (1997), with H.R. 2378, 105th Cong.,
§ 505, 111 Stat. 1272, 1304 (1997), but perhaps meaning § 640, 111 Stat. 1318).
174 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-61,
§ 640, 111 Stat. 1272, 1318 (1997).
175 See, e.g., Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2021,
Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. E, tit. VII, § 713, 134 Stat. 1185, 1432–33 (2020); Financial Services
and General Government Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-93, div. C, § 713, 133
Stat. 2434, 2487 (2019); Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act,
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. C, § 714, 123 Stat. 3159, 3208–09 (2009); Transportation,
Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, div. A, § 818, 119 Stat. 2396, 2500 (2005);
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. C, § 620, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-160 (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 105-284, at 50, 80 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).
176 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-767G, GAO’S CONGRESSIONAL
PROTOCOLS 3 (2017) (outlining review and investigation process); see also Jennifer Shutt,
Democrats Could Tie Paychecks to Testimony in Impeachment Inquiry, ROLL CALL (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.rollcall.com/2019/10/22/democrats-could-tie-paychecks-to-testimony-inimpeachment-inquiry/ [https://perma.cc/8AR5-B5WY].
177 Shutt, supra note 176.
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through a clawback and public disclosure of the action survives beyond
the current Congress and the current administration. In practice,
future administrations may be reluctant to take clawback actions if
there is continuity of party across administrations, but the party control
of the next administration may not be clear at the time the official has
to decide whether to withhold information, so the risk of personal
exposure is likely to be a factor in their decisionmaking.
Despite the structural benefits the Section 713 rider provides
Congress, it has remained relatively obscure. In the past twenty-three
years, the GAO has only found violations of the rider on two occasions.
The first, in 2004, after a six-month investigation, the GAO found that
the Administrator for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
had threatened to prevent the agency’s chief actuary from providing
information to Congress about the implications of upcoming Medicare
expansion legislation. 178 The Administrator was recommended to pay
back a portion of his salary for violating the rider.179 The second, in
2016, found that the Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s)
Deputy Assistant Secretary and an Associate General Counsel had
prevented a HUD regional office employee from communicating with
a congressional committee for 15 calendar days. 180 In 2017, HUD
ordered its former Deputy Assistant Secretary to repay $7,176 based on
an hourly rate of $74.75, but it closed the matter as to the Associate
General Counsel. 181 The rider has surfaced on other occasions as well.
For instance, in the final months of the Trump administration,
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178 GAO 2004 Letter, supra note 170, at 9, 13; Cost and Payment Plans of Medicare Part D:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov’t Info., & Int’l Sec. of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Frank Lautenberg,
Sen., Congress) (“To make matters worse, when we were considering this bill, the
Administration misled Congress about its cost. I am not saying it was intentional, but that
was the ultimate outcome. Tom Scully, who is head of the Center for Medicaid and
Medicare Services—he was the head at the time—threatened to fire the chief Medicare
actuary if he revealed the true cost of this bill to Congress. I asked GAO to investigate the
legality of Mr. Scully’s action, and GAO found out that Mr. Scully was so far out of line that
he should repay part of his salary to the government. That was more than a year ago. We
are still waiting for him to pay back the taxpayers.”).
179 Id.
180 Letter from Susan A. Poling, Gen. Couns., Gov’t Accountability Off., to Charles E.
Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, House
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, House Comm. on
the Judiciary, Gov’t Accountability Off. Decision B-325124.2 at 15 (April 5, 2016)
[hereinafter GAO 2016 Letter]; see also Letter from Aaron Santa Anna, Acting Gen. Deputy
Assistant Sec’y for Cong. & Intergovernmental Rels., Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev., to
Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (June 19, 2017)
(documenting debt collection efforts from Elliot Mincberg).
181 Letter from Aaron Santa Anna, supra note 180 (documenting debt collection
efforts from Elliot Mincberg).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 86 Side B

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B67$&.B(7B$/BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

162

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

30

[VOL. 97:1

Representatives in the House argued that by preventing State
Department officials from testifying without counsel, Department
leadership (possibly including Secretary Pompeo himself) may be in
violation of the Section 713 Rider, 182 but it does not appear that the
Representatives referred the matters to the GAO for investigation.
The Section 713 rider thus appears to be a mixed bag. On the
one hand, the design of the rider combined with the GAO’s
investigation powers avoid a remedy that is dependent on either the
Department of Justice or civil litigation to provide incentives for
compliance with Congress’s request for information from agencies.
And those sanctions have been imposed in a relatively timely manner.
On the other hand, Congress does not appear to have invoked the
provision frequently—and indeed, it seems to have remained relatively
obscure even to Congress.
2. Subpoena Rider
The question, then, is whether another oversight rider could
capitalize on the basic structure of Section 713 to more effectively
target noncompliance with congressional subpoenas. The Section 713
rider has several limitations. First, Section 713 addresses only
supervisory action—actions to prevent others from communicating
with Congress—and it does not impose an obligation on the individual
to respond to Congress. Second, the sanctions triggered by Section
713 violations are limited to salary clawback and associated negative
publicity. Third, while the Section 713 rider may arguably cover an
official who orders a subordinate not to comply with a congressional
subpoena, the rider does not target subpoena compliance directly. 183
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182 Letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, House Comm. on Foreign Affs., and Adam
B. Schiff, Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intel., and Elijah E. Cummings,
Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Reform, to John J. Sullivan, Deputy Sec’y of State,
Dep’t of State at 3 (Oct. 1, 2019); Letter from Mark Pocan, Member, Congress, to Michael
R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State (Oct. 8, 2019) (asking who prevented Ambassador
Gordon Sondland from appearing for a scheduled House interview in violation of Section
713).
183 Recent experience includes multiple examples of refusals to produce
nonprivileged documentary or testimonial evidence in response to a subpoena issued by a
congressional committee. See Press Release, House Comm. on Oversight and Reform,
White House Subpoenaed in House Impeachment Inquiry (Oct. 4, 2019), https://
oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/white-house-subpoenaed-in-houseimpeachment-inquiry [https://perma.cc/N9MC-JTAA]; Letter from Pat A. Cipollone,
supra note 126; News Roundup: Trump Administration’s Defiance of Congressional Subpoenas,
AM. OVERSIGHT (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.americanoversight.org/news-rounduptrump-administrations-defiance-of-congressional-subpoenas
[https://perma.cc/E7CJBYKC]; House Oversight Votes to Hold William Barr and Wilbur Ross in Contempt, CBS NEWS
(June 12, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-oversight-committee-votes-on-
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The following proposed rider, which we call the subpoena rider,
aims to overcome those limitations:
SEC. YY. No part of any appropriation contained in this or any
other Act shall be available for the payment of the salary of any
officer or employee of the Federal Government or used by such an
officer or employee to—
(1) refuse to produce on a timely basis documents or testimony
subject to a subpoena issued by a committee of the House or
Senate or to facilitate such conduct; or
(2) plan for, begin, continue, finish, process, or approve the preparation or presentation of false or misleading documents or
testimony in response to an information request or subpoena
issued by a committee of Congress regarding the actions of
employees or officers of government. 184
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holding-william-barr-and-wilbur-ross-in-contempt/
[https://perma.cc/S28G-6Z87];
Ramsey Touchberry, William Barr Directs DOJ Official to Defy Congressional Subpoena to Testify
About 2020 Census, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/william-barrdoj-congressional-subpoena-1404879 [https://perma.cc/TAX4-A2WN] (discussing Attorney General Barr’s instruction to a Justice Department official to defy a congressional
subpoena); Mary Clare Jalonick & Lisa Mascaro, Ex-White House Lawyer Defies House Subpoena
for Mueller Docs, AP NEWS (May 7, 2019), https://apnews.com/70a27221eea94cecb5427143
bb3eca2a [https://perma.cc/EF35-QNEJ] (discussing Don McGahn’s refusal to provide
documents to the House Judiciary Committee).
184 This rider is modeled on a 2020 abortion rider in the Commerce, Justice, Science,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-93, div. B, § 202, 133 Stat.
2385, 2412 (2019).
185 GAO 2016 Letter, supra note 180, at 2–3.
186 GAO 2004 Letter, supra note 170, at 12 n.24.
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This rider aims to provide two different sets of incentives to officials
who are named in congressional subpoenas: those related to the
official’s salary and those related to the Antideficiency Act.
First, like the Section 713 rider, this rider makes the official’s
salary contingent upon the official’s compliance with the
congressional subpoena. The salary clawback could commence with
the refusal to comply with the congressional subpoena and terminate
only at the time of compliance. That construction would be consistent
with the GAO’s interpretation of the Section 713 rider. In the 2016
enforcement proceeding, the GAO took the position that an
employee’s salary is not available “while they prevented or attempted
to prevent” a subordinate official from being interviewed by members
of Congress. 185 Likewise, in the 2004 violation, the GAO reasoned that
in light of the “continuing nature” of the Administrator’s prohibition
on testimony, all salary from the infraction to the official’s departure
should be treated as improper and subject to clawback. 186 Denying the
official’s salary from the refusal until compliance would be consistent
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187 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 176 (documenting GAO policies
and processes in response to requests from Congress).
188 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986).
189 The timing of the 2004 investigation is straightforward. GAO received the request
for investigation in mid-March 2004, and reported its results September 7, 2004. See GAO
2004 Letter, supra note 170, at 1. The timing of the 2016 is more involved. GAO initially
received a request for investigation of 2012 events on August 1, 2013. See Letter from Susan
A. Poling, Gen. Couns., Gov’t Accountability Off., to Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, and Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary,
and Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Gov’t
Accountability Off. Decision B-325124 (June 19, 2014). The GAO responded in mid-June
2014, finding no violation. See id. On April 27, 2015, Senator Grassley and colleagues
requested a reconsideration of the GAO’s 2015 decision in light of newly obtained
information. See GAO 2016 Letter, supra note 180, at 2. In light of the new evidence, the
GAO found liability in its April 5, 2016 letter. See GAO 2016 Letter, supra note 180, at 2–3.
The initial GAO investigation took 11 months, the reconsideration took 12 months.
190 See supra text accompanying notes 146–150.
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with this understanding of the violation as a continuing one. Viewing
the violation as a continuing one would speak directly to that delay:
each additional day of noncompliance would be another potential day
of salary clawback. The subpoena rider thus creates a new personal
incentive for timely compliance with congressional subpoenas.
Moreover, like the Section 713 rider, this subpoena rider creates
a sanction that does not depend on the Department of Justice for
enforcement or civil enforcement court. A member of Congress could
trigger the GAO investigation. 187 The Supreme Court has held that
the GAO is part of the legislative branch, 188 and accordingly pursuing
the investigation is also not dependent on the executive branch policy.
As to timeliness, in both the 2004 and 2016 findings of violations, the
GAO reached a conclusion within a year. 189 While still not a matter of
months, the relative promptness of the GAO’s investigation makes the
sanction a meaningful one to address delay tactics in the executive
branch. In addition, if the subpoena rider enables or requires the
agency to engage in salary clawback, as with the Section 713 rider, it
will create a risk to officials that may survive the current administration.
Both the Section 713 and subpoena oversight riders invert the
party most likely to seek judicial review, and therefore overcome
perennial obstacles to congressional committee suits. Currently, the
House and Senate face significant obstacles to obtaining judicial
enforcement of their subpoenas, including difficulties demonstrating
their standing and other justiciability doctrines. 190 With these
oversight riders, officials found in violation by the GAO face an everincreasing salary clawback. As a result, it is the officials, not the
congressional committees, who would be most likely to seek judicial
review to challenge the clawback determination. Indeed, given that
the officials face loss of salary for as long for the duration of their
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refusal to comply with a subpoena, the officials likely would be
motivated to seek expedited relief from the courts. In that litigation,
the executive officials would easily satisfy standing requirements given
their concrete and individual interests, redressable by the courts, and
could easily take advantage of the Administrative Procedure Act’s
provision of a cause of action for suits by persons aggrieved by agency
action, 191 all of which have proven more difficult when Congress is the
plaintiff.
This subpoena rider also creates an additional layer of incentives
beyond those in the Section 713 rider. By prohibiting “the use” of
appropriated funds for resistance to congressional subpoenas, the
violation of the rider would also violate the Antideficiency Act. The
Antideficiency Act, which dates from 1870, was enacted to prevent
executive branch officials from spending beyond the moneys
appropriated for a fiscal year and later seeking a deficiency
appropriation from Congress. 192 The Act makes it unlawful for government officials to “make or authorize”193 an expenditure that has not
been appropriated or to work without an appropriation except in
emergencies. 194 The Antideficiency Act thus prohibits any officer or
employee from using funds, including funds expended by working on
the federal payroll, in a manner other than appropriated.195 Because
appropriations riders, whether in the form of caps on spending or
limitations on the purposes for which funds may be expended, define
the limits of the funds appropriated, executive branch officials violate
the Antideficiency Act if they violate an appropriations rider. 196
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191 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018); see also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970).
192 Metzger, supra note 19, at 1088; see also STIFF, supra note 30, at 40.
193 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2018).
194 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2018); see also Atlas Brew Works v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 6, 9
(D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 820 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
195 See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018).
196 STIFF, supra note 30, at 40–41 (noting that executive officials violate the
Antideficiency Act when they violate a conditional rider, even if the agency has not
exceeded its total appropriations). Appropriations riders may be enacted outside of the
appropriations process through Congress’s general legislation, but the Department of
Justice takes the view that Antideficiency Act liability attaches only when the condition or
rider is enacted as part of the appropriations legislation, not afterwards. See Use of
Appropriated Funds to Provide Light Refreshments to Non-Federal Participants at EPA
Conferences, 31 Op. O.L.C. 54, 67 (2007) (noting that the agency “must look [only] to the
applicable legislative act making the amounts in question available for obligation or
expenditure” to identify the cap or limitation, the violation of which leads to Antideficiency
Act violations). There are grounds to challenge that narrow reading of the Antideficiency
Act, as the GAO does. See GARY L. KEPPLINGER, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-317450,
ANTIDEFICIENCY ACT—APPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS ON THE USE OF
APPROPRIATIONS 5(2009) (“If a statute, whether enacted in an appropriation or other law,
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Federal employees and officers have strong reasons to avoid
violating the Antideficiency Act.197 The Act requires that violations be
reported to “the head of the agency” who then “shall report
immediately to the President and Congress.”198 The report, signed by
the agency head, must explain what the violation was, how it occurred,
its effects on the agency, and any remedies taken, including
disciplinary measures or additional policy safeguards. 199 The Act
authorizes administrative discipline, including suspension without pay
or removal from office. 200 Unique among budgeting laws, it also
includes a provision for criminal penalties for “knowingly and
willfully” violating the Act. 201 Even though no prosecution has been
brought to date under the Act’s criminal sanctions, 202 the mere
existence of criminal penalties on the books is a deterrent to executive
branch officials. 203
Like the Section 713 rider, the Antideficiency Act creates
sanctions for violations that are personal to the official—such as
administrative discipline ranging from suspension without pay or
removal from office. 204 Avoiding those disciplinary measures, much
less the embarrassment of prompting a GAO investigation and
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prohibits an agency from using any of its appropriations for a particular purpose, the agency
does not have ‘an amount available in an appropriation’ for that purpose.” (quoting 31
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2018))). The most pragmatic approach is simply to include any
oversight rider, like the subpoena rider, in the original appropriation act. See generally 31
U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2018).
197 See Matthew B. Lawrence, Disappropriation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 82–83 (2020)
(arguing that the Antideficiency Act gives civil servants strong incentives to comply with
appropriations limits); see also Metzger, supra note 19, at 1153–54 (noting same in context
of general discussion of internal checks within the executive branch).
198 31 U.S.C. § 1351 (2018).
199 See id.; OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB CIRCULAR A–11, supra note 44, § 145.7
(2021).
200 31 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (2018) (authorizing administrative discipline for violations of
§ 1341 and § 1342). As Metzger notes, courts have construed the Antideficiency Act’s
reporting and penalty requirements as precluding a private cause of action. Metzger, supra
note 19, at 1124 (citing Feldman v. Bowser, 315 F. Supp. 3d 299, 305 (D.D.C. 2018)).
201 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018) (providing criminal sanctions for knowing and willful
violations); see also 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 23, at 6-143 (noting that
the Antideficiency Act is the only budget law with both administrative and penal sanctions).
202 See 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 23, at 6-144 (noting no
prosecutions under Antideficiency Act to date).
203 As one IRS employee put it, “when it comes to the Antideficiency Act, which has
criminal penalties associated with it, we take it very seriously.” Deposition of David Fisher
to the Comm. on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Representatives 34 (May 11, 2016), https://
democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files
/documents/HWM132060%5b1%5d.pdf [https://perma.cc/WH7C-J4YY].
204 31 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (2018) (authorizing administrative discipline for violations of
§§ 1341 and 1342).
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potentially triggering the obligation of the head of the agency to
personally report to the President and Congress, provide another layer
of strong ex ante incentives for officers and employees to avoid
overstepping an appropriations rider.
4. Oversight Riders and Executive Privilege
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205 As noted below, the GAO is not bound by Department of Justice advice.
206 Whether Appropriations May Be Used for Informational Video News Releases, 29
Op. O.L.C. 74, 74 (2005) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727–32) (“Bradbury
Memo”).
207 For an account of the boundaries of reasonable reliance on the constitutional
analysis of executive branch lawyers, see Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Executive Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 B.U. L. REV. 197, 235–37 (2020).
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It is worth spelling out how the subpoena rider would interact with
assertions of executive privilege. Many refusals to comply with
congressional subpoena invoke executive privilege. The official will be
advised by the Justice Department to assert executive privilege.
Currently, the executive official will have little financial incentive to
know whether the assertion is a valid one. Even if a court orders
disclosure or finds that there was no valid basis for withholding the
information, there is no personal legal sanction for the official’s
noncompliance and contempt. Congress must simply endure the
delay from even the most aggressive assertions of executive privilege.
The subpoena rider would change that dynamic.
The
Department of Justice would still serve as counsel to the executive
official. But once prompted by a member of Congress, the GAO would
also be making an independent determination of the validity of the
assertion of the privilege. 205 The GAO is not part of the executive
branch, and therefore is not bound by the Office of Legal Counsel’s
advice. 206 The GAO has demonstrated that independence. For instance, in its 2004 finding of a violation of Section 713, the GAO
rejected the Department of Justice’s argument regarding Section 713
and its application to the executive’s constitutional powers, and found
liability. The subpoena rider thus creates an ex ante incentive for the
official to know, at the time of resistance to the subpoena, whether the
assertion of executive privilege or deliberative process privilege made
on his or her behalf is a reasonable one. 207 If it is reasonable advice,
the official could have some assurance that the GAO would not find a
violation of the oversight rider and, in any event, the official could
successfully challenge in court the GAO’s determinations to halt the
official’s salary or any Antideficiency Act violations. However, if the
advice is not reasonable advice—as is the case with many blanket or
extremely broad refusals to cooperate—the official will know that his

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 89 Side B

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B67$&.B(7B$/BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

168

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

30

[VOL. 97:1

12/21/2021 11:58:47

C M
Y K

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 89 Side B

or her actions in resistance contravene congressional appropriations,
which creates risks for his or her salary and for Antideficiency Act
sanctions.
This oversight rider thus works on the problems of incentives and
timing that frequently arise with assertions of executive privilege. The
rider makes the decision about whether to comply with the
congressional subpoena one that is consequential to the official
personally; the possible sanctions run to the individual, in terms of
salary, disciplinary reprimands, etc., not just the reduction in the
agency’s funding (which, in some administrations, might actually be
desired). As a result, the subpoena rider creates ex ante incentives to
evaluate whether the claimed executive privilege is within the scope
that a court would likely uphold. Moreover, those personal risks will
exist even if the agency conducts a run-out-the-clock strategy.
Noncompliance with a congressional request does not merely mean
possibly being a named defendant in litigation to enforce the
subpoena. Instead, noncompliance immediately raises the prospect of
a salary clawback and Antideficiency Act violations, both of which have
the potential to extend beyond the current Congress or administration
and be enforced by an administration of a different political party.
But does Section 713 or the subpoena rider unduly burden the
executive branch’s power to assert executive privilege? To begin with,
courts could construe the oversight riders narrowly as applied to
ensure that they do not unduly trammel on executive powers while still
honoring the legislative judgment they embody. Even aside from
invoking constitutional avoidance, there is a good argument that
oversight riders do not impose too great a burden on the assertion of
executive privilege. The executive official may still challenge a salary
clawback or Antideficiency Act violation in court. If the court holds
the assertion of privilege to be a valid one, then it will deny any salarybased or Antideficiency Act liability. Moreover, as noted above, the
official should have an easy time meeting the justiciability requirements for suit under the APA.
Moreover, these riders prompt the GAO to provide its own
independent assessment of the validity of an assertion of executive
privilege. In most cases, one would hope the GAO and Department of
Justice would agree. But the GAO is not part of the executive branch—
it is part of the legislative branch. Although in some cases the GAO’s
decision could burden the assertion of executive privilege, as long as
the GAO closely adheres to judicial precedent on the scope of the
privilege and gives some measure of deference to the Department of
Justice’s views, conflict will arise only when the executive branch relies
upon an unreasonably broad assertion of privilege. If the assertion of
privilege is only burdened when the assertion is unreasonably broad,
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it is difficult to see how the rider imposes an unconstitutional burden
on assertions of executive privilege. We address other constitutional
objections to oversight riders below.
5. Effects Across the Agency Hierarchy
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208 See, e.g., Ellen M. Gilmer, Ex-DOJ Official Called ‘Radioactive’ After Alleged Election Plot,
BLOOMBERG L.: ENVI’T & ENERGY REP. (Jan. 23, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com
/environment-and-energy/ex-doj-official-called-radioactive-after-alleged-election-plot
[https://perma.cc/TJ3G-U5P5] (discussing reluctance of law firms to hire former top DOJ
lawyer involved in resistance to 2020 presidential election results).
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Oversight riders could have an uneven impact on officials at
different levels in the agency hierarchy. In the first instance, oversight
riders—whether the Section 713 rider or the subpoena rider—are
more likely to be effective with executive officials lower in the agency
hierarchy, who presumably have a stronger interest in avoiding salary
reductions and adverse personnel sanctions, and have fewer exit
options than those in agency management or political appointees.
No doubt oversight riders would not be a sufficient incentive to
create disclosure in all cases. Consider a political appointee who
simply says “no” to a congressional subpoena. If the official had
financial independence, the salary sanction would be potentially
embarrassing but not create a strong incentive to comply with the
subpoena. Because simply saying “no” consumes only de minimis
government resources, it would not trigger appropriations limitations.
Still, most instances of executive branch resistance are coordinated
efforts, not matters of a lone wolf refusing to cooperate with Congress.
And it is the coordinated resistance, from officials up-and-down an
agency or department’s hierarchy, that create the real problems for
oversight. That coordination, including strategic steps to furnish
minimal, evasive, or under- or over-inclusive responses to
congressional subpoenas, involves the expenditure of government
time and resources. Even if the pressure of oversight riders is greatest
on lower-level employees, their reluctance to violate subpoenas would
also create pressure on agency leaders to get ahead of disclosures that
could prompt forthcoming testimony of lower-level officials.
The publicity and reporting requirements that attach to both
Section 713 and Antideficiency Act violations may be particularly
unwelcome to political appointees in agencies who are looking to
move into private sector or other organizations with ethical screens for
top managers. 208 In the event that an administration began, with
proper notice, to enforce the criminal sanctions of the Antideficiency
Act, those criminal proceedings would also require disclosure for some
employees after they move to the private sector. For instance, the
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires publicly traded
companies to disclose any criminal convictions or pending criminal
cases in the last ten years against its directors and executive officers in
the annual report the company files with the SEC. 209 The SEC also
requires disclosure of the civil violations of directors and executive
officers, but civil violations are only required to be disclosed if the
violations are related to securities and commodities. 210 The SEC has
similar requirements for employees of investment adviser firms.211
To be sure, some executive branch officials bent on obstruction
may still refuse to comply with a subpoena even if they face loss of
salary, personnel or other legal sanctions under the Antideficiency Act.
But oversight riders still do something the other tools do not: they
enhance the ex ante legal and career incentives for executive branch
officials to comply. Moreover, the incentive not to violate the oversight
rider applies regardless of whether Congress and the President are
from the same party and creates risks that extend beyond the current
Congress and President.
C. The Constitutionality of Oversight Riders
Congress’s power to tax and authorize spending is one of the
more explicit provisions of Article I. It expressly provides that “[n]o
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.” 212 The Constitution provides that no
money may “be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously
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209 SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2020), establishes the specific requirements
for companies that are required to report to the SEC. Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310,
through Item 10, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10, incorporates 17 C.F.R. § 229.401, which identifies the
required disclosures that companies must make about certain personnel, and § 229.401(f)
requires disclosure of involvement in certain legal proceedings by requiring the company
to “[d]escribe any of the following events that occurred during the past ten years and that
are material to an evaluation of the ability or integrity of any director, person nominated to
become a director or executive officer of the registrant . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f) (2020).
210 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f)(3)–(8) (2020).
211 When registering as a new firm, the firm must disclose any convictions or felony
charges against any of its employees or managers, as well as a variety of investment-related
civil actions. FORM ADV: UNFIROM APPLICATION FOR INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION
AND REPORT BY EXEMPT REPORTING ADVISERS, PART 1A, item 11(A), SEC (2019), https://
www.sec.gov/forms. An investment adviser firm must also disclose any convictions against
its managers when distributing a disclosure brochure to a potential new client. Id., PART
2A, item 9(A)(1). An investment firm must also disclose any misdemeanor convictions and
pending criminal proceedings for “any fraud, false statements, or omissions, wrongful
taking of property, bribery, perjury, forgery, counterfeiting, extortion, or a conspiracy to
commit any of these offenses” by any employee when registering and by its managers when
distributing a disclosure brochure. Id., PART 1A, item 11(B); see id., PART 2A, item 9(A)(1)–
(2).
212 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7.
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sanctioned.” 213 The explicit emphasis of the Appropriations Clause is,
as Metzger writes, to “ensure[] that the executive branch must
continuously secure congressional support for its chosen courses of
action.” 214 The appropriations power is a critical, constitutionally
created means for Congress to check the executive. 215 Congress has
reinforced this constitutional authority with two statutes attaching
sanctions for expenditures without appropriations. The Purpose Act
specifies that expenditures shall only be for “the objects for which the
appropriations were made,” 216 and, as just noted, the Antideficiency
Act prohibits officials from expending or committing funds that have
not been appropriated. 217
Oversight riders, however, do not merely implicate Congress’s
appropriations power. They also implicate the President’s constitutionally vested powers. 218 The executive branch has long taken the view
that Congress cannot use its appropriation powers to impede or
frustrate the executive branch’s capacity to perform its own
constitutionally assigned powers. 219 The Office of Legal Counsel takes
the position, for instance, that Congress cannot achieve indirectly
through the denial of funding to the President what it could not
accomplish by other means. 220 Although executive privilege is not a
duty or power expressly granted by the Constitution, the executive
branch takes the view that the President has a constitutional privilege
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213 See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850).
214 Metzger, supra note 19, at 1140.
215 See id.
216 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a); see, e.g., State and Local Deputation of Federal Law
Enforcement Officers During Stafford Act Deployments, 36 Op O.L.C. 77, 78 (2012).
217 See 31 U.S.C. § 1341–42 (2018); see also Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and
Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357, 368 (2018).
218 For contending opinions on the constitutionality of Section 713, compare
Memorandum from Jack Maskell, Legis. Att’y, American Law Division, to Charles Rangel,
House Comm. on Ways & Means (Apr. 26, 2004) (defending the constitutionality of
Congress to impose penalties for executive branch officers who impeded Congress’s access
to information) with Authority of Agency Officials to Prohibit Employees From Providing
Information to Congress, 28 Op. O.L.C. 77 (2004) (arguing that President’s power to
supervise includes a power to prohibit nonprivileged information from disclosure).
219 See Metzger, supra note 19, at 1143 n.359 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
691 (1988)); STIFF, supra note 30, at 58.
220 See Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 469 (1860) (“If Congress had
really intended to make [a military officer] independent of [the President], that purpose
could not be accomplished in this indirect manner any more than if it was attempted
directly.”); see also Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a
Temporary Lapse in Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 297, 299 (1981) (“Manifestly,
Congress could not deprive the President of [a constitutional] power by purporting to deny
him the minimum obligational authority sufficient to carry this power into effect.”); see
Metzger, supra note 19, at 52.
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221 See supra note 92 (listing memoranda on executive privilege).
222 GAO 2004 Letter, supra note 170, at 13; Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019,
2032–33 (2020).
223 Price, supra note 217, at 389–90.
224 Id. at 362, 393.
225 Id. at 418.
226 See id.
227 A cert. petition challenging Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019) is
pending, but arguments are postponed pending consideration of the Biden
administration’s request to withdraw the petition. In Sierra Club, the Ninth Circuit struck
down the Trump administration’s decision to reprogram funds for use to construct the
border wall.
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from disclosure. 221 The GAO and the Supreme Court have taken a
narrower view. 222
Even if it is conceded, as the Department of Justice maintains, that
some aspects of the President’s functions are not subject to Congress’s
appropriations power, the kind of testimony and information that
Congress routinely seeks through subpoenas falls far from that
constitutional line. Zachary Price has recently proposed a particularly
persuasive way to draw the line between the President’s constitutional
powers and Congress’s appropriations powers. Price suggests that
Congress’s appropriations powers do not reach activities the President
can perform personally, and thus without the need for additional,
congressionally authorized resources—such as the power to veto
legislation, nominate officers, remove officers, demand opinions from
the heads of departments, and convene or adjourn Congress. 223 In
contrast, Price argues, the President is beholden to appropriations
limits as to those powers that require resources to exercise—“resourcedependent” powers 224—such as enforcing the law and making war.
Because these powers necessarily require resources, they can be
checked through Congress’s use of appropriations powers.225 The
lion’s share of Congress’s subpoenas pertain to the exercise of powers
dependent on congressional appropriations and so would easily fall
within the scope of what Congress can regulate through
appropriations. That is true, for instance, of information sought from
the EPA in the Gorsuch affair, from the DOJ regarding the Fast and
Furious Operation, and the Department of Defense regarding
President Trump’s impeachment proceedings. More than isolated
presidential judgment, these powers emerge from and are inextricably
linked to the ability of the executive branch to expend funds, and as
such, may be limited through appropriations. 226 Put another way, so
long as Congress seeks information that does not impinge on the
President’s ability to personally exercise her constitutional functions,
it may condition its expenditure on the executive branch not
obstructing Congress’s investigation. 227
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Recent litigation over the effect of riders on Department of Justice
federal prosecutions for marijuana possession nicely illustrates the
scope of Congress’s power over resource-dependent activities of the
executive branch. In the early 2010s, President Obama’s Department
of Justice continued to pursue federal marijuana charges in states that
had laws allowing the use of medical marijuana. In response,
Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), a long-time advocate of
medical marijuana legalization, partnered with Representative Sam
Farr (D-CA) to introduce the Rohrabacher-Farr amendment in the
House. 228 The amendment sought to bar the DOJ from spending
funds to enforce the Controlled Substances Act in states with medical
marijuana reform laws; 229 a similar amendment had been proposed but
gotten nowhere in different iterations throughout the 2000s. 230 By
2014, 32 states and the District of Columbia had passed medical
marijuana laws, 231 and the House passed the Rohrabacher-Farr amendment in May of 2014. 232 In the Senate, it gained support from Senators
Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Rand Paul (R-KY).233 Although the rider was
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228 Burgess Everett, Lawmakers Warn DOJ to Back Off Medical Marijuana Prosecutions,
POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/lawmakers-warn-dojto-back-off-medical-marijuana-prosecutions-116781 [https://perma.cc/W9KB-P4EK]. The
exact language of the amendment is nicely laid out in United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d
1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2016).
229 The language of the limitation rider is as follows:
None of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be
used, with respect to the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin, to prevent such States from implementing their own State laws that
authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235, div. B, § 538, 128 Stat. 2173, 2217 (2014).
230 Bill Piper, A Decade of Hard Work Turns into Historic Marijuana Victory in Congress,
DRUG POL’Y ALL. (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.drugpolicy.org/blog/decade-hard-workturns-historic-marijuana-victory-congress [https://perma.cc/AC6D-X934].
231 S.V. Dáate, GOP House Votes to Leave States Alone on Medical Marijuana, NPR (May
30, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2014/05/30/317427925/gophouse-votes-to-leave-states-alone-on-medical-marijuana [https://perma.cc/7YHZ-4M2Y];
see also PEW RSCH. CTR., MAJORITY NOW SUPPORTS LEGALIZING MARIJUANA 5 (2013).
232 Associated Press, House Backs State Marijuana Laws, POLITICO (May 30, 2014),
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/gop-house-backs-state-medical-marijuana-laws107244 [https://perma.cc/3Q3U-K2CH].
233 Press Release, Drug Pol’y All., Breaking News: Senators Rand Paul (R-KY) and Cory
Booker (D-NJ) to Offer Groundbreaking Medical Marijuana Amendment on Senate Floor
(June 18, 2014), https://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2014/06/breaking-news-senatorsrand-paul-r-ky-and-cory-booker-d-nj-offer-groundbreaking-medical
[https://perma.cc
/BN4M-XBJG]
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never separately voted upon, 234 it ended up in the infamous
“CRomnibus” bill of 2014: a bill that was part omnibus bill, legislation
Congress passes to fund the government when an agreement can be
reached, and part continuing resolution or CR, legislation that keeps
the lights on when members of Congress cannot reach a deal. 235
Congress passed the CRomnibus bill to avoid a government shutdown;
it was laden with amendments and riders, including the RohrabacherFarr rider, by the time it reached the President’s desk. 236
The Department of Justice chose to interpret the RohrabacherFarr amendment narrowly, taking the view that it merely prevents the
department from “impeding the ability of states to carry out their
medical marijuana laws,” but does not prevent them from continuing
to prosecute individuals and organizations within states with medical
marijuana laws. 237 Dana Rohrabacher and Sam Farr contested this
interpretation in a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder, calling it
“emphatically wrong.”238 The Ninth Circuit emphatically sided with
Rohrabacher and Farr and against Attorney General Holder in United
States v. McIntosh. 239 Defendants, owners and operators of dispensaries
and growers of marijuana, argued that their prosecutions under the
Controlled Substances Act violated the appropriations limits that
Congress had established. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the
Rohrabacher-Farr rider prevented the DOJ from spending money to
prosecute individuals so long as those individuals fully complied with
their state medical marijuana laws. 240 The McIntosh decision affirms
Congress’s power to regulate the President’s resource-dependent
powers, even those that implicate the President’s constitutionally
vested authority to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

234 See Congress Set to Pass Landmark Medical Marijuana Legislation, AMS. FOR SAFE ACCESS
(Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.safeaccessnow.org/congress_set_to_pass_landmark_medical
_marijuana_legislation [https://perma.cc/R347-EMVU].
235 Andrew Prokop, Why the CRomnibus is Called the CRomnibus, VOX (Dec 13, 2014),
https://www.vox.com/2014/12/13/7385253/what-is-cromnibus
[https://perma.cc
/NA4R-C3LX].
236 Ezra Klein, How to Sound Smart About the 2015 Appropriations Bill, VOX (Dec 11,
2014),
https://www.vox.com/2014/12/11/7376585/cromnibus-2015-appropriationsdetails [https://perma.cc/J4RF-LV4V].
237 Timothy M. Phelps, Justice Department Says It Can Still Prosecute Medical Marijuana
Cases, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nnmedical-marijuana-abusers-20150401-story.html [https://perma.cc/7H44-EDGE] (quoting
Department of Justice spokesperon Patrick Rodenbush).
238 Everett, supra note 228 (quoting Letter from Dana Rohrabacher, Member,
Congress, and Sam Farr, Member, Congress, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just. (Apr.
8, 2015)).
239 833 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th Cir. 2016).
240 Id. at 1177–79.
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241 See Devins, supra note 29, at 464–65.
242 See id. at 464–65 (noting these and other reasons to be cautious about limitations
riders).
243 Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking,
Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1797 n.30 (2015).
244 Id. at 1800.
245 Interestingly, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 includes a longstanding appropriations rider providing that none of the fund appropriated will be
available to fund the salary of an official who prevents or threatens to prevent any employee
from having any written communications with a member of Congress. See Financial Services
and General Government Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. E, § 713, 134
Stat. 1380, 1432–33 (2020).
246 Price, supra note 217, at 374 (discussing the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. C, §§ 8110–11, 128 Stat. 86, 131 (2014), and spending
limits expending funds to close Guantanamo).
247 Id. at 377.
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Limitations riders have long been disfavored—and for good
reason. Because they are enacted through the yearly appropriations
process, limitations riders generally lack review by an authorizing
committee with subject matter expertise. 241 As a result, limitations
riders typically do not reflect the level of consideration, deliberation,
and committee process that ideally attaches to authorizing
legislation. 242 Indeed, the growing prevalence of limitations riders is a
symptom of larger breakdown of legislative processes in Congress, 243
and Congress’s increased reliance on appropriations bills to enact
substantive policy. 244
There are several levels of response to this objection. First and
perhaps most importantly, there is nothing unlawful about oversight
riders—they are consistent with Congress’s established powers of the
purse to condition its appropriations on those appropriations being
used for some purposes and not others. 245 Second, oversight riders
involve less substantive policymaking than standard limitations riders.
Unlike standard limitations riders, they do not prohibit spending on
broader policies; they do not, for instance, prohibit spending money
to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center, 246 or to prosecute drug
crime in states that have legalized the use of certain drugs. 247 Oversight
riders merely deny funding for resistance of congressional oversight.
Although it is always difficult to make a clean distinction between
process and substance—and especially so where oversight is most
intense and most resisted over controversial substance—there is still a
difference between dictating a substantive policy through a rider and
creating a limit on the executive branch’s power to resist Congress’s
attempts at oversight.
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248 See Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Essay, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 915, 920–21 (2018); see also Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004) (conceptualizing constitutional hardball as practices
that are “within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine” but nonetheless strain
“existing pre-constitutional understandings”).
249 See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 248.
250 See id. 935–36 (offering Obama’s deferred action policy in response to the Senate
filibuster of the DREAM Act as an example of constitutional self-help in response to
hardball).
251 See Pozen, supra note 27, at 12; see also Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 248, at 934
(noting President Clinton’s aggressive assertions of executive privilege were instances of
constitutional hardball).
252 See Pozen, supra note 27, at 12 (noting self-help involves a branch’s unilateral
response to a perceived wrong committed by another branch).
253 See id.
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Third, and at a broader level, oversight riders are a means for
Congress to respond to the constitutional hardball of the executive
branch. Oversight riders are not useful or designed for CongressExecutive relations when those arrangements are at their best. Their
value comes as a response to the very real circumstances of divisive
constitutional hardball by the executive branch. Constitutional
hardball involves practices or actions that strain constitutional
understandings for partisan ends. 248
For instance, democratic
filibusters of President George W. Bush’s judicial nominations and the
Senate refusal to give a hearing to President Obama’s nomination of
Merrick Garland for a seat on the Supreme Court fall within the
category of constitutional hardball—they each breach a historical
practice for what appear to be primarily partisan purposes. 249 Likewise,
the decisions in the Obama administration to halt deportation and
grant work authorization to many immigrants who came into the
country as children could be seen as self-help in response to the
hardball tactics of Senate Republicans to thwart passage of
immigration legislation that had majority support in both houses.250
Oversight riders are tools of constitutional self-help in response to
executive branch stonewalling. 251 They are a means by which Congress
can defend its own institutional prerogatives in response to the
perceived wrong of the executive branch failing to disclose
information to which it is entitled. 252 Unpacking the concept of
constitutional self-help, David Pozen suggests that constitutional selfhelp is controversial (and gains interest) in part because the means
used are generally impermissible or disfavored but asserted to be
justified in the context. 253 Oversight riders are controversial too
precisely because they involve a hardball response by Congress
through the blunt legislative tool of appropriations.
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254 Id. at 64.
255 These options are carefully considered in CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION,
supra note 134, at 194.
256 JAMES V. SATURNO, BILL HENIFF JR. & MEGAN S. LYNCH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42388,
THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 7 (2016).
257 H.R. Res. 2863, 109th Cong., 119 Stat. 2680 (2005).
258 Alex Tausanovitch & Sam Berger, The Impact of the Filibuster on Federal Policymaking,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues
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Although self-help measures risk escalating institutional conflicts
in unproductive ways, oversight riders fit within the basic standards or
norms of constitutional self-help. First, they address a core and
legitimate interest of Congress that has been thwarted by the executive
branch. Second, oversight riders are targeted or reciprocal “in the
sense that they are closely bound to the motivating wrong.” 254
Congress could use other tools to make life difficult for the President.
It could refuse to confirm the President’s appointees, refuse to take up
the President’s legislative priorities, decline to act on the President’s
requests to ratify treaties, institute impeachment proceedings against
recalcitrant executive officials, and use the powers of the purse to
reduce the funding, salaries, or discretion of particular executive
branch offices that have failed to provide information. 255 Oversight
riders are more narrowly targeted than these other countermeasures—
even reducing salaries of recalcitrant officials is a broader sanction
than directly disqualifying spending in response to resistance to
legitimate congressional oversight. Even if use of limitations riders is
generally disfavored, they are a justified and proportional response to
the executive branch’s obstruction of congressional oversight.
Moreover, the fact that oversight riders are reciprocal and
proportionate—they are narrowly tailored to respond to the harm of
executive stonewalling—also recommends them over other possible
countermeasures. Perhaps stronger medicine still is in order. But it is
worth trying oversight riders first to see if they effectively increase the
costs to executive branch actors of resisting legitimate oversight in such
a way that they will help to restore a lost constitutional equilibrium.
It is also worth addressing a further, more practical objection.
Appropriations bills are subject to the presidential veto and the
filibuster in the Senate like other legislation. 256 Why would the
President sign an appropriations law that included oversight riders?
Appropriations bills are generally viewed as must-pass and have an
annual deadline, and as a result, they have been magnets for riders of
various kinds. Occasionally these riders have prompted filibuster in
the Senate. For instance, Senate Democrats filibustered the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 257 because the bill provided funds
for Iraq and Hurricane Katrina relief, 258 successfully inducing those
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provisions to be dropped. Likewise, Senate Republicans filibustered
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act259 because it included
the DREAM Act, which would have provided a path to citizenship for
qualified undocumented immigrants. 260 Even though there have been
occasional, successful efforts by the House or Senate to remove a rider
or provision in an annual appropriations measure, these bills continue
to include a wide range of riders, including riders to which the
executive branch routinely objects. 261 The practical need to pass
annual appropriations legislation to avoid a government shutdown
makes oversight riders more politically viable than they would be as
standalone legislation in periods of divided government.
The attachment of oversight riders to appropriations legislation
also has a timing advantage. The federal government requires appropriations, so appropriations bills move through Congress in one form
or another even in periods of partisan gridlock. 262 Because the federal
fiscal year begins on October 1 of each year, at any given time the
pressure arising from an oversight rider attached to an appropriations
bill should become effective no more than a year from the date that an
appropriations bill will be enacted. Often the time will be much
shorter, and the target of the rider will likely be aware of the pending
rider while the appropriations process is underway. In addition, the
leverage created by the need to fund the federal government and the
political fallout of being seen as having shut down the government may
enable adoption of these riders, even if independent legislation
regarding subpoenas would get bogged down in partisan conflict.
III.

APPROPRIATIONS AND UNDERENFORCED GOOD GOVERNMENT
NORMS
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/democracy/reports/2019/12/05/478199/impact-filibuster-federal-policymaking/
[https://perma.cc/SQ28-L4JL].
259 H.R. Res. 3326, 111th Cong., 123 Stat. 3409 (2009).
260 Tausanovitch & Berger, supra note 258.
261 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1640 (Dec. 19, 2014)
(President Obama’s signing statement objecting that the restrictions on spending imposed
by the act violated separation of powers).
262 See MacDonald, supra note 161, at 767.
263 Cf. Metzger, supra note 19, at 1153 (noting that appropriations powers can be a
potent tool to combat presidential unilateralism).
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Oversight riders highlight how Congress can use its
appropriations powers to enforce its own institutional prerogatives to
obtain information from the executive branch and compliance with
the law. 263 As noted, the virtue of oversight riders is that they create
incentives, personal to executive branch officials, to comply with the
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law (or what they believe a fair reading will be by a federal court), and
they do so on a timely basis. The question we entertain in this final
Part is whether appropriations incentives could make a difference for
compliance with a range of other good government legislation that
binds the executive branch but has been underenforced in recent
years. 264 We consider three sets of good government laws: protections
against partisan political activity by federal government employees,
compliance with federal ethics laws, and guarantees for transparency
and recordkeeping.
A. Political Activity
The Hatch Act is the primary federal legislation that prohibits
executive branch officials from using their official authority to engage
in campaigning. Specifically, it prohibits any individuals employed by
the federal government, other than the President and Vice President,
from using their official authority and influence for the purposes of
interfering with or affecting election results.265 The regulations
implementing the Hatch Act clarify that using an official title or
position while participating in political activities, such as campaigning,
fall within the prohibitions of the Act. 266 The penalties for violation of
the Hatch Act include disbarment from federal service for up to five
years and a fine not to exceed $1,000.267
The Hatch Act is enforced by the Office of Special Counsel
(OSC), an independent federal investigative and prosecutorial agency.
During the Trump administration, the OSC found that President
Trump’s advisor, Kellyanne Conway, had violated the Hatch Act on
numerous occasions,268 and Peter Navarro had also violated the Hatch
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264 Our focus is on underenforced good government norms, the requirements that
govern the day-to-day activities of government officials, but the concept of underenforced
norms has been explored at length regarding constitutional norms. See, e.g., Lawrence
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1212, 1213–20 (1978) (noting the role of institutional concerns in leading to
underenforcement of constitutional norms); Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE
L.J. 1343, 1393 (1988) (noting that “[t]he constitutional norms worthy of the attention of
scholars and decisionmakers are not limited to those that might be articulated and enforced
by the courts”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 468–69 (1989) (noting that “there is a difference between what the Constitution
requires and what the Supreme Court, interpreting the Constitution, is willing to compel”
and arguing that that the reluctance of courts to invalidate statutes “strengthens judicially
underenforced constitutional norms”).
265 See 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1) (2018).
266 5 C.F.R. § 734.302 (2020).
267 5 U.S.C. § 7326 (2018).
268 See U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS., OSC FILE NOS. HA-19-0631 & HA-19-3395, REPORT
OF PROHIBITED POLITICAL ACTIVITY UNDER THE HATCH ACT (2019).
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269 U.S. OFF. SPECIAL COUNS., OSC FILE NO. HA-20-000279, REPORT OF PROHIBITED
POLITICAL ACTIVITY UNDER THE HATCH ACT (2020).
270 Brian Slodysko, Watchdog Groups Say Convention Appearances Broke Hatch Act, AP
News (Aug. 27, 2020), https://apnews.com/a6ea0162c2ea6242cb9c8284c451560f
[https://perma.cc/XV4Z-FD4M] (noting numerous arguable Hatch Act violations,
including by Chad Wolf and Michael Pompeo, among others); Eliza Relman, Ivanka Trump
Showers Her Father with Praise in a Triumphant Republican Convention Speech from the White
House, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 27, 2020) https://www.businessinsider.com/ivanka-trump-rncspeech-praises-trump-2020-8 [https://perma.cc/38NE-6P9A].
271 H.R. 8363, 116th Cong. (2020).
272 See id. § 1002(a).
273 Id. § 1002(b).
274 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1) (2018).
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Act. 269 Many believe that the OSC did not adequately enforce the
Hatch Act, including arguable violations by the appearance of Chad
Wolf, at the time Acting Director of the Department of Homeland
Security, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Ivanka Trump during
the televised 2020 Republican National Convention. 270
In response to concerns that the Hatch Act was underenforced
and does not include adequate penalties, the House of Representatives
passed the Protecting Our Democracy Act in 2019, although it stalled
in the Senate. 271 The Protecting Our Democracy Act would enhance
the penalties for violation of the Hatch Act to up to $50,000 and grant
the OSC more independent prosecutorial authority. 272 The bill would
also extend the Hatch Act to the President and Vice President. 273
Regardless of whether a new version of the Protecting Our
Democracy Act is passed, Hatch Act riders modelled on oversight
riders could play a useful role in increasing the incentives to comply
with the Hatch Act prohibitions. Like an oversight rider, a Hatch Act
rider would prohibit federal officials from expending any funds to use
their “official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with
or affecting the result of an election” 274 as understood under the Hatch
Act. Such a rider would make Hatch Act violations also violations of
the Antideficiency Act, triggering an additional set of penalties and
possibly also expanding the number of officials with an interest in
ensuring compliance. This would increase the fines available and the
prominence of the Hatch Act within the set of prohibitions that apply
to executive officials.
The difference Hatch Act riders would make is less significant
than oversight riders. Oversight riders create ex ante personal incentives to comply with the law that are lacking in the context of
congressional subpoena enforcement. Although some penalties are
already attached to the Hatch Act—and potentially more will be if the
Protecting Our Democracy Act is enacted—the addition of Hatch Act
riders could be a step toward further internalizing the Act’s important
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prohibitions on partisan use of office for high-level executive branch
officials.
B. Ethics
Congress has enacted numerous laws to ensure that government
officials comply with basic ethics requirements and remain
accountable for their actions. The federal ethics laws include 1962
legislation banning federal employees from switching sides on certain
matters 275 and preventing them from “personally and substantially”
taking part in activities that could affect their financial interests
(including the interests of family members). 276 The 1978 Ethics in
Government Act, which was enacted following the Watergate scandal,
requires public disclosure of personal financial interests by senior
federal executives, 277 and addresses ethics enforcement issues through
creation of the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Senate
Legal Counsel, as well as by authorizing the Attorney General to
appoint a special counsel to investigate executive branch employees. 278
In addition, in 1995 Congress adopted the Lobbying Disclosure Act,
which updated earlier requirements to include a comprehensive
registration and disclosure regime for lobbyists. 279 It was updated in
2007 following the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal. 280
Despite the reforms following the Watergate and Abramoff
scandals, the Trump era exposed additional weaknesses in the federal
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275 See 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. I 1962); 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(B) (2018) (members of
the executive branch are permanently banned from switching sides on any matter that they
“personally and substantially” participated in while working for the government). For a
discussion of the 1962 legislation, see JACK MASKELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42728, POSTEMPLOYMENT, “REVOLVING DOOR,” LAWS FOR FEDERAL PERSONNEL 3 (2014).
276 See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (Supp. I 1962); 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2018). For an overview of
the conflict of interest requirements for federal officials, see OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
LAWS RELATING TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH EMPLOYMENT (2006).
For a compilation of federal ethics rules, see U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS,
COMPILATION OF FEDERAL ETHICS LAWS (2021). Several ethics statutes and recent bills are
designed to reduce the risks arising from the revolving door between public and private
sector employers. For a recent overview, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jonathan M. Gilligan
& Haley Feuerman, The New Revolving Door, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1121, 1132–35 (2020)
(reviewing federal ethics rules adopted in response to the revolving door).
277 See 28 U.S.C. App. (Supp. II 1979); J. Jackson Walter, The Ethics in Government Act,
Conflict of Interest Laws and Presidential Recruiting, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 659, 659 (1981).
278 See Rebecca L. Anderson, The Rules in the Owners’ Box: Lobbying Regulations in State
Legislatures, 40 URB. LAW. 375, 380 (2008).
279 See Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–12
(2018)); see also Anderson, supra note 278, at 382.
280 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, tit. 2,
121 Stat. 735, 741 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–14 (2018)).
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ethics regime. Gaps emerged in both the legal requirements and
enforcement of norms regarding ethical behavior, including
prohibitions on steering federal contracts to family and friends and
requirements to disclose conflicts of interests by nominees in the
Senate confirmation process. 281 Other good government ethics
practices also have been challenged. Perhaps the best-known example
is that President Trump is the first President since Watergate to refuse
to release his tax returns, a practice that can identify potential conflicts
of interest. 282 In addition, soon after he was confirmed, Attorney
General William Barr demonstrated that although a Designated Ethics
Official may advise a political appointee to recuse from a matter in
which the Attorney General or the President has a personal interest,
the appointee can simply ignore that advice without risk of civil or
criminal sacntions.283
The recent experience has demonstrated the loopholes not only
in the ethics requirements, but also in their enforcement. For
instance, the experience demonstrated that formal legal enforcement
is often not possible at all or not possible on a timely basis, instead
demonstrating the extent to which many of the ethics requirements
adopted since Watergate “relied more on tradition and shame than on
enforceable law.” 284 The reliance on tradition and shame suggests that
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281 See, e.g., Russell Spivak, Purse Strings and Self-Dealings: How Congress Can Use the
Budget to Prevent the Executive Branch’s Ethics Violations, 98 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 131 (2020)
(proposing funding riders to address presidential self-dealing that is not addressed by
federal criminal or civil law); Michael Sozan & Will Ragland, Recent Political Scandals the ‘For
the People Act’ Would Prevent From Recurring, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 4, 2019), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2019/02/04/465792/recentpolitical-scandals-people-act-prevent-recurring/
[https://perma.cc/9TR4-ADFZ]
(detailing recent ethics issues in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches).
282 See, e.g., Jeff Stein, The IRS Turned over Nixon’s Tax Returns the Same Day a
Congressional Panel Asked for Them, WASH. POST (July 25, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/25/irs-turned-over-nixons-tax-returns-sameday-that-congressional-panel-asked-them/ [https://perma.cc/47ZV-QJR2].
283 Matthew Choi, Key Moments from William Barr’s Confirmation Hearing, POLITICO (Jan
15, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/15/key-moments-barr-promises-toprotect-mueller-special-counsel-1101410 [https://perma.cc/F36D-V262]; Matt Richardson
& Jake Gibson, AG William Barr Not Recusing Himself from Russia Probe, Official Says, FOX NEWS
(Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/ag-bill-barr-not-recusing-himself-fromrussia-probe-official-says [https://perma.cc/RD8Z-6NJL]; Elizabeth Williamson, Beyond
Impeachment, a Push for Ethics Laws That Do Not Depend on Shame, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/us/politics/trump-ethics-democracy-biden.html
[https://perma.cc/7HZ8-RUEV] (noting that officials can reject ethics advice without the
risk of legal sanction).
284 Williamson, supra note 283 (discussing the Protecting Our Democracy Act and
noting that the Office of Government Ethics “relies on a president’s desire to avoid scandal
and impropriety, and the Senate’s reluctance to schedule confirmation hearings for
nominees who have not filed the proper paperwork and committed to divestiture”).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 97 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B67$&.B(7B$/BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2021]

OVERSIGHT RIDERS

30

183



C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

285 Id.
286 See For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong., tit. VIII (2021).
287 See id. § 10001.
288 See id. §§ 8007, 8014.
289 Id.; see also id. tit. VIII, subtit. D.
290 Spivak, supra note 281, at 131, 133–34 (proposing use of a “funding rider” that
would bar transfer of federal funds to companies owned by high-ranking officials and
creation of a private right of action to enforce the funding rider).
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the effects of federal ethics requirements are limited when executive
branch employees do not fear social or political sanctions. As Susan
Hennessey has noted, “[t]he mechanism that preserved that [postWatergate] system was the fear of paying a political price . . . . Now we
know that if there’s not a credible fear of that, we’re likely to see future
presidents attempting to violate these rules or push the boundaries
more and more.”285
As with the Hatch Act, the weaknesses in federal ethics
requirements and enforcement that became apparent during the
Trump administration have prompted proposals for new legislation.
The first bill introduced in the new House of Representatives, the For
the People Act of 2021 (FPA), includes new ethics requirements and
enforcement provisions that closely track recent scandals. 286 For example, the FPA would require presidents to disclose their tax returns for
the prior decade, 287 limit contracting at businesses owned by certain
government employees, 288 and close other loopholes in ethics
requirements. The FPA also includes an entire subtitle addressing
enforcement, including provisions to reauthorize the Office of
Government Ethics, to insulate it from political pressure, and to
increase its ability to discipline federal employees. 289
The FPA is unlikely to be enacted in the form adopted by the
House, however, and even if it is gaps will remain. Unethical
employees will exploit any remaining weaknesses in the requirements,
and enforcement will still rely heavily on the willingness of political
appointees at the Department of Justice to enforce its requirements
and federal courts to promptly resolve disputes. Appropriations riders
could provide a more nimble response regarding ethics requirements
than existing laws—they could be developed and adopted quickly as
new ethics problems arise. For example, when an extraordinary new
situation arises, such as rejection of the recusal recommendation of a
Designated Ethics Official, a rider could be adopted in the next
appropriations bill to prevent use of federal funds to implement
decisions by the official rejecting the recusal recommendation.290
Ethics riders could also enhance enforcement by increasing the
perceived likelihood and magnitude of the sanction by executive
branch officials subject to ethics requirements. For the reasons
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discussed regarding the Hatch Act-related appropriations riders, ethics
appropriations riders would add additional agency-level and
individual-level sanctions for noncompliance. The risk to offending
employees may be greater than the risks of simply violating ethics rules,
since additional Antideficiency Act violations would have occurred on
top of ethics violations. The violations would be more likely to be
enforced as well because by triggering Antideficiency Act concerns that
may extend beyond any one administration, the riders also would
increase the risk of enforcement even after the employee leaves the
federal government.
C. Transparency
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291 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–09 (2018).
292 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101–07 (2018).
293 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
294 See, e.g., Ellen Cranley, Trump Won’t Stop Ripping Up Papers, So Staffers Have to Literally
Tape Them Back Together “Like a Jigsaw Puzzle,” BUS. INSIDER (June 11, 2018) (quoting
Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov
/presidential-libraries/laws/1978-act.html [https://perma.cc/587P-7P8Y] (last modified
Jan. 13, 2021)), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-rips-papers-staffers-tape-together2018-6 [https://perma.cc/V8YZ-F4FP].
295 See David Brennan, Trump Ate Sensitive Document After Cohen Meeting, Former White
House Aide Claims, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-ate-
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A core aspect of good governance is transparency, and as with
issues concerning political activity and ethics, the last several years have
revealed gaps in the scope and enforcement of federal transparency
requirements that could be addressed with appropriations riders.
Several statutes aim to ensure that public records of the President’s
actions are created and maintained, as well as to ensure public access
more generally to information produced by the executive branch.
These statutes include the Presidential Records Act, 291 the Federal
Records Act, 292 and the Freedom of Information Act. 293 The
obligations these statutes impose on federal agencies play a
fundamental role in providing public access to information about the
executive branch, but as with the legal requirements addressing
political activity and ethics, they include loopholes and are difficult to
enforce in a timely manner.
For instance, the Watergate-era Presidential Records Act states
that the President has “responsibility for the custody and
management” of presidential records and requires presidential
materials to be filed with and preserved by the National Archives. 294
Media accounts suggest that the federal records management staff’s
attempts to ensure compliance with the Presidential Records Act were
often thwarted by President Trump. 295 Similarly, media accounts
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sensitive-document-after-cohen-meeting-former-white-house-aide-1069399 [https://perma
.cc/VTW5-FNNJ]; Alana Abramson, Richard Nixon Is the Reason President Trump’s Aides Have
to Repair Documents He Rips Up, TIME (June 11, 2018), https://time.com/5308542/trumppresidential-records-nixon/ [https://perma.cc/76VX-M2Y9].
296 See Kaitlan Collins, Senior White House Staff Signed Nondisclosure Agreements at Trump’s
Request, CNN (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/21/politics/donald-trumpwhite-house-nondisclosure-agreements/index.html [https://perma.cc/284D-585P].
297 See Ex-Aides: Pruitt Ordered EPA to Deliberately Slow Compliance with FOIA Requests,
ENV’T WORKING GRP. (June 11, 2018), https://www.ewg.org/release/ex-aides-pruittordered-epa-deliberately-slow-compliance-foia-requests [https://perma.cc/X8L2-ACL2].
This may have occurred in other agencies, departments, and commissions as well. See Eric
Rosenbaum, Trump’s SEC ‘Determined to Leave Public in the Dark’ on Climate Change, Sierra
Club Alleges in Lawsuit, CNBC (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/24/sierraclub-sues-sec-for-first-time-over-blocked-climate-resolutions.html
[https://perma.cc
/QK6Q-4ZVZ].
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suggest that President Trump took the unprecedented step of insisting
that White House employees on the federal payroll sign broad
nondisclosure agreements that extend beyond national security
matters. 296 Whether these nondisclosure agreements impinge on the
creation and retention of records subject to the Presidential Records
Act is unclear, but they certainly limit the transparency regarding
presidential actions that is the underlying objective of the Act.
Media accounts also suggest that agencies managed responses to
information requests under the Freedom of Information Act in ways
that protected then-current political staff. For instance, these accounts
suggest that during the Trump administration EPA staff were
prioritizing requests that focus on the prior administration and were
deliberately slowing down or not providing requested information that
may be politically embarrassing to the Trump administration.297
Although the recent proposed legislative reforms—the Protecting
Our Democracy Act and For the People Act—may increase
government transparency indirectly by facilitating Congressional
oversight, they face barriers to passage in the Senate and do not focus
on reforms to the core federal transparency statutes. Transparency
riders could step in to thwart executive branch efforts to undercut
these statutes. For instance, although Congress has little ability to
regulate the President’s personal conduct, it can use transparency
riders to cut funding for White House offices that fail to develop
systems to comply with the Federal Records Act despite the President’s
actions. Riders also can be structured to increase the personal liability
of individuals who issue or implement illegal directions regarding
recordkeeping. To stem the use of nondisclosure agreements,
transparency riders can bar payment of a salary to any official who has
signed a nondisclosure agreement for any topic other than classified
information, and riders can prohibit the use of federal funds to draft,
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administer or enforce a nondisclosure agreement that is not limited to
this information. Similarly, transparency riders can discourage efforts
to undermine compliance with the Freedom of Information Act,
including by providing automatic funding cuts if agency officials fail to
meet disclosure targets.
In short, riders can increase compliance not only with oversight
subpoenas, but also with legal requirements regarding the political
activities, ethics, and transparency of federal employees. We view the
use of riders as a second-best response to the erosion of informal social
checks and balances and of institutional, rather than party, loyalty.298
In the absence of effective alternatives, however, increased use of
riders may be necessary to ensure compliance with law and restore
some of the informal constraints that affected inter-branch relations in
a less partisan era.
CONCLUSION
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298 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Social Checks and Balances: A Private Fairness Doctrine,
73 VAND. L. REV. 811 (2020) (discussing the role of polarization in the erosion of the social
checks and balances that constrain politicians’ behavior); Finkel et al., supra note 18, at 534
(discussing the difficulty of policymaking when polarization has worsened to become
sectarianism).
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Through aggressive assertions of executive privilege and blanket
refusals to appear, the executive branch has been able to thwart
effective congressional oversight. The Trump administration took a
particularly uncooperative stance in relation to congressional
oversight, but the problem has much deeper roots and is likely to rise
again whenever one house of Congress is controlled by a different
political party from the President. The set of tools Congress has come
to reply upon—primarily heading to the courts to enforce its own
constitutional powers—is not working. The long delay involved in
judicial enforcement of congressional subpoenas and civil contempt
orders renders those options largely useless against a determined
executive branch. This Article outlines an approach that uses the core
appropriations powers of Congress to increase the incentives of
executive officials to comply with congressional subpoenas. Oversight
riders can remedy some of the shortcomings that have emerged from
the failures of the oversight process, and they can point the way toward
the use of appropriations riders to address many other areas of eroding
legal and social norm compliance in the executive branch.

